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I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States should drop all criminal charges against
1
Zacarias Moussaoui, not because he is innocent, but because he is
a foreign citizen who is (or was) a terrorist bent on killing innocent

† Associate Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law. Prior to
joining the legal academy, Professor Radsan had extensive experience as a federal
prosecutor and as Assistant General Counsel at the Central Intelligence Agency.
Professor Radsan thanks Greg Eich and Dan Moak for their tireless and excellent
research assistance on this article. He also thanks Professor Wayne Logan from
William Mitchell College of Law and Professor Robert Chesney from Wake Forest
University School of Law for their insightful comments on an earlier draft of this
article.
1. Zacarias Moussaoui, the infamous “20th Hijacker,” was arrested in
Minnesota in August 2001. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON
THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 247 (2004) [hereinafter 9/11 REPORT],
available at http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf.
He is
currently the only defendant facing trial for the September 11 terrorist attacks.
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Americans, destroying American property, and disrupting
2
American society. For less than a nanosecond, Moussaoui should
be a free man again. Once the federal criminal charges against
him are dropped, Moussaoui’s publicly paid lawyers, including the
Federal Defenders of the Eastern District of Virginia, should be
released from their services. Those who are broad-minded might
thank the defense lawyers for doing their best—despite
Moussaoui’s antics—to defend him. Those who offer such thanks
do so based on a presumption of innocence, and on a criminal
process that strives to give a fair trial to even those accused of the
3
most despicable crimes. But these presumptions and assumptions
are the faith of the criminal realm. To apply them to the military
or intelligence realm may be heresy, folly, madness, or worse.
Before the nanosecond of Moussaoui’s freedom ends, he
should be transferred to the custody of the United States
4
Department of Defense. After that, based on recommendations
coordinated by the National Security Council (NSC) for the
President, the Executive Branch should implement a wellconceived decision about Moussaoui’s next address. The NSC,
rather than a particular United States agency, such as the Justice
Department or the Defense Department, is the appropriate forum
to vet such policies because they transcend the boundaries between
domestic and international spheres, going beyond law enforcement
and military issues. The NSC, which sits above the various agencies
in a coordinating role, was, after all, created in 1947 “to advise the
President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and

2. The most recent charges against Moussaoui, through superseding
indictment, are: (1) conspiracy to commit acts of terrorism transcending national
boundaries, (2) conspiracy to commit aircraft piracy, (3) conspiracy to destroy an
aircraft, (4) conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction, (5) conspiracy to
murder Unites States employees, and (6) conspiracy to destroy property. See
Second Superseding Indictment at 1, United States v. Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d
480 (E.D. Va. filed July 2002) (Criminal No. 01-455-A), available at
http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/1:01-cr-00455/docs/66826/ 0.pdf.
3. I am sure that many defense lawyers model themselves after Gregory
Peck’s moving portrayal of Atticus Finch in To Kill a Mockingbird. See generally TO
KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (Universal Studios 1962).
4. For a model of transferring a prisoner from one realm to another,
consider Jose Padilla’s transfer from custody under a material witness warrant to
the custody of U.S. military authorities. See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711,
2716 (2004) (noting that Padilla was taken into custody by Department of Defense
officials and transported to a Naval Brig in Charleston, South Carolina, where he
has been held ever since).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol31/iss4/4

2

Radsan: The Moussaoui Case: The Mess from Minnesota
RADSAN (REVISED)

2005]

4/25/2005 1:15:51 PM

THE MESS FROM MINNESOTA

1419
5

military policies relating to the national security.” The President,
in making this decision on Moussaoui’s next address, should
consider our relations with foreign countries and the safety of our
6
homeland. But whatever happens to Moussaoui, he did not—and
does not—belong in criminal custody. That is the straightforward
thesis of this article.
The Bush Administration, in many public statements, has said
that September 11 changed everything about U.S. counter7
terrorism policy. To the dismay of critics, many of them in the
legal academy, the Bush Administration has described this policy as
8
a “war” against terrorism. Whether we call it a policy or a war,
dealing with individuals and organizations that seek our
9
destruction is serious business. Prior generations won the Cold
War to protect us. It is up to this generation, and perhaps future
generations, to succeed in a new struggle to preserve our nation
5. National Security Act of 1947, ch. 343, tit. I, § 101, 61 Stat. 496.
6. One possible option would be a transfer to foreign authorities, with
France, the country of Moussaoui’s citizenship, being an obvious example. Other
options include a military facility within the United States (e.g., the brig in
Norfolk, Virginia), a military facility within U.S. territory (e.g., Guam), a military
facility in a place whose jurisdictional status is not completely clear as a result of
recent Supreme Court precedent (e.g., Guantanamo Bay, Cuba), or a facility on a
mobile platform (e.g., an aircraft carrier that stays out to sea).
7. See, e.g., President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress
and the American People (Sept. 20, 2001), at http://www.whitehouse.gov
/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html (describing the United States’
concerted and protracted effort against terrorism); President George W. Bush,
Radio Address of the President to the Nation (Sept. 15, 2001), at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/ news/releases/2001/09/20010915.html (describing
the United States’ concerted and protracted effort against terrorism); Press
Release, President George W. Bush, At O’Hare, President Says “Get on Board,”
Remarks by the President to Airline Employees (Sept. 27, 2001), at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010927-1.html
(stating
that America is fighting a “new type of war”).
8. PHILIP B. HEYMANN, TERRORISM, FREEDOM, & SECURITY: WINNING WITHOUT
WAR 19-33 (BCSIA Studies in International Security ed., 2003) (arguing, inter alia,
that intelligence and international law should be used to construct our nation’s
counter-terrorism framework and that a military-based “war” on terrorism runs
counter to traditional American policies).
9. For the consensus of a bipartisan panel of experts, see, e.g., 9/11 REPORT,
supra note 1, at 363–64.
[To] [c]all[] this struggle a war accurately describes the use of American
and allied armed forces to find and destroy terrorist groups and their
allies in the field . . . . But long-term success demands the use of all
elements of national power: diplomacy, intelligence, covert action, law
enforcement, economic policy, foreign aid, public diplomacy, and
homeland defense.
Id.
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and our values. For this reason, the Moussaoui case, which has
languished in our courts for over three years, is a sad relic of the
10
past, a modern version of Bleak House, a bitter reminder of a time
when we naively believed that terrorism was more a law
11
enforcement problem than a national security problem. Now that
the Bush Administration has settled into a second term, it should
be less concerned about the political fallout from controversial
12
decisions and more intent on trying to do what is right. The time,
if ever, for empty posturing is over. Transferring Moussaoui to
military custody would thus be a sign of strength, serving as a first
step in a more reasoned and strategic policy for dealing with
13
terrorists.
14
This article, after giving a brief history of the Moussaoui case,
identifies the main paradoxes or problems of continuing to deal
15
with him in the criminal system. By no stretch of the imagination
does this article provide an exhaustive or comprehensive treatment
of the Moussaoui case. Each problem, by itself, could be the
subject of a separate law review article. This article suggests that
Moussaoui, rather than Yaser Esam Hamdi, or Jose Padilla, or the
detainees in Guantanamo Bay, could have served as the true test for
determining the minimum process that the American
Constitutional system owes to an individual whose goal is our

10. CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE 50 (Norman Page ed., Penguin Books
1971) (1853). In this Dickens novel, it was the Jardyce case that seemingly
dragged on forever.
11. In this regard, my criticism goes beyond political orientations. As many
have noted and admitted, neither the Clinton Administration nor the Bush
Administration got “it”—“it” referring to the gravity of the danger from Islamic
extremists. For a view that the Clinton Administration got “it” more than the Bush
Administration, see Richard Clarke’s polemical book, Against All Enemies: Inside
America’s War on Terror. RICHARD A. CLARKE, AGAINST ALL ENEMIES: INSIDE
AMERICA’S WAR ON TERROR (Free Press 2004) [hereinafter AGAINST ALL ENEMIES].
For a view that the threat was out there for us to see as long ago as the Iranian
Revolution in the late 1970s, see id. at 36–37 (stating that the Iranian Revolution
“drew America further into the realm of Islam”).
12. In this regard, after John Kerry’s defeat, President Bush’s statement that
he “earned [political] capital in the campaign, and now . . . intend[s] to spend it
on . . . winning the war on terror,” can be seen as a positive. Press Release,
President George W. Bush, President Holds Press Conference (Nov. 4, 2004), at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/11/20041104-5.html.
13. To show this strength, it makes most sense to transfer Moussaoui at a time
in the case, whether in district court or in the Fourth Circuit, when the public
does not perceive that the legal rulings are going against the government.
14. See infra Part II.
15. See infra Part III.
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16

annihilation.
The distinction between the Moussaoui case and
the Hamdi/Padilla cases is that Moussaoui is not a U.S. citizen.
The distinction between the Moussaoui case and the
Hamdi/Padilla/Guantanamo cases is that the Bush Administration
has offered more convincing evidence in public filings that
Moussaoui was a major player connected to a major terrorist plot.
The premise of this article is that we should respect our rule of law
but that we should not treat terrorists any more decently than
17
required. To do more than the law requires, in an age of weapons
18
of mass destruction, is more folly than an act of humanity.
Although this article does not address the case of a non-U.S. citizen
who is a major player arrested outside the United States, it follows
that someone like Khaled Sheik Mohammed (KSM), the alleged
16. See Moussaoui Uncooperative in Court (CBS television broadcast, Apr. 22,
2002), at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/04/25/attack/main507248.
shtml (Moussaoui frequently quoted the Koran and prayed to Allah for the
destruction of the United States). For a flavor of the rants and ramblings that led
Judge Brinkema to revoke Moussaoui’s right of self-representation, see, e.g.,
Defendant’s Motion for Access to Tape at 2, United States v. Moussaoui, 282 F.
Supp. 2d 480 (E.D. Va. filed Oct. 31, 2003) (Criminal No. 01-455-A), available at
http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/1:01-cr-00455/docs/69361/1.pdf (stating
that prosecutor David Novak is conducting a national therapy session disguised as
a trial and that “[a]s for America [sic] [p]ost [t]raumatic [d]isorder the [u]nique
[b]est [l]awyer [Moussaoui] is [g]lad to [p]rovide a [w]ar [t]herapy [c]ompany to
[t]reat [m]ass [c]asualty of [d]eranged Americans”); Attachment to Defendant’s
Motion at 2, United States v. Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480 (E.D. Va. filed Oct.
31,
2003)
(Criminal
No.
01-455-A),
available
at
http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/1:01-cr-00455/docs/69364/1.pdf (asserting
that American taxpayers paying for the Moussaoui trial are being robbed by al
Qaeda); Attachment to Defendant’s Motion at 1, United States v. Moussaoui, 282
F. Supp. 2d 480 (E.D. Va. filed Oct. 31, 2003) (Criminal No. 01-455-A), available at
http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/1:01-cr-00455/docs/69367/1.pdf (stating
that he, the infamous twentieth hijacker, is the “little bitch of Leonie Brinkema”);
Defendant’s Motion to Stipulate Rights & Duties at 1, United States v. Moussaoui,
282 F. Supp. 2d 480 (E.D. Va. filed July 15, 2002) (Criminal No. 01-455-A),
available at http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/1:01-cr-00455/docs/66846/
0.pdf (motioning to stipulate his right and duty to live a long and happy life on
this earth with four wives and to stop Judge Brinkema from misrepresenting his
fight for life).
17. I have not yet joined the cottage industry of offering comprehensive
advice on counter-terrorism strategy. Those who do often draw on comparative
experiences—for example, the Israeli experience with Palestinian terrorism or the
British experience with IRA terrorism. See, e.g., MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE LESSER
EVIL (Princeton University Press 2004).
18. My fear is that historians of future generations will view the United States
the way we view the British troops who fought against America’s Founding
Fathers—as old-fashioned types who marched in file in red uniforms, failing to
adjust to new methods and rules of war.
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mastermind of the 9/11 plot, should not be treated any better than
19
Moussaoui. This article’s conclusion is that the Moussaoui case is
20
better resolved through a military proceeding.
II. THE HISTORY OF THE MOUSSAOUI CASE
The Moussaoui case is back where it started in the Eastern
District of Virginia. Judge Brinkema, the presiding judge over the
prosecution, will set a trial date now that the Supreme Court
decided not to grant the writ of certiorari filed by the Moussaoui
defense team concerning how much access they should have to
three Al Qaeda members—potential witnesses—who are in
21
detention.
The Moussaoui defense team alleged that these
detainees tend to exculpate Moussaoui from the criminal charges,
supporting his claim that he was not part of the September 11 plot,
and tended to mitigate his culpability if the case reaches the death
22
penalty stage. Unsatisfied with the Fourth Circuit’s most recent
en banc ruling on these topics, the Moussaoui defense team took
23
their case to the highest level in our judicial system. As a result,
Judge Brinkema had kept the case off the court’s trial calendar
24
while the Supreme Court decided what to do.
Moussaoui was detained weeks before September 11, 2001,
during the period when the default mode for dealing with

19. Accordingly, KSM is being held indefinitely for interrogation in an
undisclosed location. Human Rights Watch, The U.S.’s “Disappeared”: the CIA’s
Long-Term “Ghost Detainees,” HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH BRIEFING PAPER, at 37 (Oct.
2004), available at http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/usa/us1004/us1004.pdf.
20. See infra Part VII.
21. Moussaoui v. United States, 383 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 2005
WL 218482 (denied without comment).
22. See Government’s Motion at 1, United States v. Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp.
2d. 480 (E.D. Va. filed Dec. 2, 2002) (Criminal No. 01-455-A), available at
http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/1:01-cr-00455/docs/70316/0.pdf
(ordering that “[u]ntil the Supreme Court has ruled on the petition, and on
[Moussaoui’s] appeal if the petition is granted, this case will remain stayed to
conserve limited resources of the judiciary and to minimize disclosure of classified
information”).
23. See Defendant’s Response to Government’s Motion to set a Trial Date at 1,
United States v. Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480 (E.D. Va. filed Nov. 8, 2004)
(Criminal No. 01-455-A), available at http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/1:01cr-00455/docs/ 70295/0.pdf.
24. See Order at 2, United States v. Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480 (E.D. Va.
filed
Dec.
2,
2004)
(Criminal
No.
01-455-A),
available
at
http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/1:01-cr-00455/docs/70316/0.pdf (refusing
to set a trial date).
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25

terrorists was through law enforcement. In response to tips from
a flight school in Minnesota about a suspicious flight student—who,
with scant flying knowledge, desired training as an “ego boosting
thing” and wanted to “take off and land” a Boeing 747—special
agents from the Minneapolis field office of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) began an investigation into Moussaoui’s strange
26
practices. Moussaoui was first held, not on terrorism charges, but
27
on immigration violations. As the public has learned from former
FBI supervisor Coleen Rowley and others, the special agents
pleaded with bureaucrats at FBI headquarters to authorize a
warrant to search Moussauoi’s computer under the Federal
28
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). Yet, FBI headquarters, as
publicized by hearings before the Joint Inquiry Staff and the 9/11
Commission, did not believe they had sufficient evidence
29
connecting Moussaoui to a foreign power for purposes of FISA.
25. The first attack on the World Trade Center in 1993 resulted in
convictions against Mohammad Salameh, Nidal A. Ayyad, Mahmud Abouhalima,
Ahmad Ajajfour, Ramzi Yousef, and Eyad Ismoil. William C. Banks & M.E.
Bowman, Executive Authority for National Security Surveillance, 50 AM. U.L. REV. 1, 98–
99 (2000). The attacks on U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in 1998 resulted
in convictions against Mohamed Rashed Daoud al-‘Owhali, Khalfan Khamis
Mohamed, Mohamed Sadeek Odeh, and Wadih el Hage. Phil Hirschkorn, Four
Guilty in Embassy Bombings Trial (May 30, 2001), available at
http://edition.cnn.com/2001/LAW/05/29/ embassy.bombings.03/.
26. The pre-September 11 period to the Moussaoui case is summarized in the
9/11 Report. 9/11 REPORT, supra note 1, at 273–76.
27. Id. at 247.
28. Id. at 273–74.
29. See The FBI’s Handling of the Phoenix Electronic Communication & Investigation
of Zacarias Moussaoui Prior to Sept. 11, 2001: Hearings Before the Select Committee on
Intelligence, U.S. Senate & the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence House of Rep.,
107th Cong. 19–20 (2002), available at http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/
0209hrg/020924/hill.pdf (prepared statement of Eleanor Hill, Staff Director,
Joint Inquiry Staff noting that a misunderstanding between FBI headquarters and
Minneapolis led to the conclusion that there was insufficient information to show
that Moussaoui was an agent of a foreign power under FISA); see also 9/11 REPORT,
supra note 1, at 274. To obtain a warrant under the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA), the Justice Department needs to show, inter alia, that the
search or the electronic surveillance relates to a “foreign power” or “an agent of a
foreign power.” 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3)(A) (2002). FISA—only applicable within
the United States—is Congress’s arrangement, in response to the landmark “Keith”
decision, United States v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan, 407 U.S. 297 (1972), to regulate electronic surveillance and searches for
national security purposes within the United States. FISA has withstood all general
attacks on its constitutionality. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 746 (2002)
(holding that the government may, without contravening the Fourth Amendment
to the United States Constitution, conduct surveillance of an agent of a foreign
power if the “significant purpose” of such surveillance is foreign intelligence).
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So, in an attempt to gather additional evidence, the FBI special
agents initiated requests—what they call leads—for assistance from
30
foreign authorities, including France and Britain. Disappointed
that FBI headquarters was not giving Moussaoui the attention the
special agents believed he deserved, they opened a back channel to
31
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
From the CIA, they
sought information and assistance. Part of the assistance they
32
sought was in dealing with their own bureaucracy. It was in this
way that senior officials at the CIA received more comprehensive
briefings about Moussaoui than did the upper echelons of the
33
FBI.
The U.S. authorities, operating under the old paradigm, were
not sure they had the grounds for a FISA warrant, a regular search
34
warrant, or an arrest warrant in the Moussaoui case. Accordingly,
rather than think beyond the law enforcement paradigm, they
searched for another justification for Moussaoui’s detention within
35
the existing paradigm.
Accordingly, on August 15, 2001, a
36
material witness warrant was issued against Moussaoui.
Three weeks later, on that fateful September day, while the FBI
was still waiting for some responses from foreign authorities,
37
nineteen hijackers boarded four commercial planes. Meanwhile,
Moussaoui, the evidence related to him, and possible connections
between him and other terrorists remained on hold while two
planes crashed into the twin towers of the World Trade Center, a
third plane took out a chunk of the Pentagon, and a fourth plane,
thanks to the heroics of the passengers who learned that their
hijackers intended to use their plane as a missile, crashed into a
field in Pennsylvania, killing everyone on board. That is perhaps

30. See 9/11 REPORT, supra note 1, at 274.
31. See id.
32. See id. at 275–76.
33. See id. at 275 (stating that neither of the FBI’s top two officials were
briefed about Moussaoui prior to September 11, 2001, but the Director of Central
Intelligence was briefed on Moussaoui on August 23, 2001).
34. Id. at 274–76.
35. It is not clear why the authorities did not continue to hold Moussaoui for
immigration violations. Perhaps U.S. authorities, fearful of letting a big fish get
away, had no intention of deporting him.
36. Under the federal material witness statute, “[i]f it appears . . . that the
testimony of a person is material in a criminal proceeding, and if it is shown that it
may become impracticable to secure the presence of the person by subpoena, a
judicial officer may order the arrest of the person.” 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2001).
37. See 9/11 REPORT, supra note 1, at 274.
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the tragedy within the tragedy—the lingering thoughts that the
catastrophe could have been averted if our officials had better
performed their jobs and if the legal structures had not gotten in
38
their way.
The dire predictions from FBI special agents about
Moussaoui and other suspicious individuals came true. Later, while
the World Trade Center was smoldering in ruins, after investigators
and prosecutors had gathered enough evidence to convince a
grand jury that there was probable cause that Moussaoui had
committed a crime, he was arraigned on federal charges and held
39
without bail in the Alexandria Detention Center.
Other than the initial inquiries the FBI made of Moussaoui
while he was in flight school and before his arrest, it does not
appear from the public record that U.S. authorities have been able
to interrogate Moussaoui. Worse, honoring the rights of a criminal
defendant who claimed to be indigent, the United States has
provided Moussaoui with legal counsel, and the taxpayers have

38. Ahmed Ressam, once bent on blowing up the Los Angeles airport as a
part of the Millenium Plot, was cooperating with U.S. authorities before
September 11. It has been reported that Ressam later tied evidence from
Moussaoui to the Hamburg cell that played a leading role in executing the
September 11 plot. See 9/11 REPORT, supra note 1, at 275–76 (noting that Ressam’s
cooperation with investigators helped to link Moussaoui to Afghan terrorist
camps); see also Michael Isikoff & Mark Hosenball, What the PDB Didn’t Say: Perhaps
George Bush Would Have Paid More Attention to the August Memo if it had Contained
Some of What was Already Known About Al Qaeda’s Activities, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 14, 2004,
available at http://64.233.167.104/ search?q=cache:OGkHHl06NkoJ:editor.msn.
com/id/4741570/ (stating that Ressam told American officials that he recognized
Moussaoui as an Afghan training camp student who was tied to the Hamburgbased terrorist cell). Therefore, this is one of those “what if” scenarios that
analysts and many other citizens will ponder for years. Could the plot have been
unraveled if these connections were allowed to be made before September 11? It
has also been reported that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the “mastermind” behind
the September 11 plot, would have called off the operation if he had believed that
there was a significant possibility that Moussaoui, in detention, was giving
information to U.S. authorities. See 9/11 REPORT, supra note 1, at 276. The
interrogation of Ramzi Binalshibh also revealed that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed
would have called off the 9/11 attacks had he been cognizant of Moussaoui’s
arrest. Id. at 541 n.107 (citing INTELLIGENCE REPORT, Interrogation of Ramzi
Binalshibh, Feb. 14, 2003). “Intelligence Reports,” cited in the 9/11 Report, are
actually identical to what the CIA refers to as “cables.” Cables are simply (1)
communications between operatives and CIA headquarters or (2)
communications between operatives themselves.
39. Larry Margasak, Citing Need to Resolve Motions, Judge Won’t Set Moussaoui
Trial, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 4, 2004, at 26, available at 2004 WL 100743817 (noting that
Moussaoui is being held in the Washington suburbs at Alexandria’s detention
center).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2005

9

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 4 [2005], Art. 4
RADSAN (REVISED)

1426

4/25/2005 1:15:51 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:4

40

gotten the bill.
Defense counsel, at their first meeting with
Moussaoui, almost surely advised him not to volunteer any
statements to the authorities or to other prisoners. This is standard
practice. Even when Moussaoui was representing himself, having
relegated his counsel to standby status, he sometimes seemed
shrewd enough not to make any obvious admissions to the
41
charges. In any event, at no time did American officials have the
opportunity to interrogate Moussaoui in the aggressive fashion that
is being used on KSM and other Al Qaeda cohorts whom we treat
42
as terrorists rather than criminals.
These other terrorists are
40. Indeed, Moussaoui relishes in the fact that American taxpayers are
footing the bill for his legal representation. See Defendant’s Motion at 1, United
States v. Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480 (E.D. Va. filed Oct. 31, 2003) (Criminal
No. 01-455-A), available at http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/1:01-cr00455/docs/69364/1.pdf (stating that “[Judge Brinkema] must release $260,000
of American Taxpayer money to pay for al Qaeda pro se suicide legal operation . .
. [and] . . . God willing the 12 American Taxpayer[s] [sic] will enjoy the $260,000
show . . . what about the $260,000 day light robbery by al Qaeda”).
41. See Transcript of Plea Hearing at 43, United States v. Moussaoui, 282 F.
Supp. 2d 480 (E.D. Va. filed July 25, 2002) (Criminal No. 01-455-A), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/transcripts/moussaoui072502.
htm (speaking only in hypothetical terms). At one point, while Moussaoui was
discussing the possibility of pleading guilty to charges, he admitted to Judge
Brinkema that he is a “member of al Qaeda . . . [and] pledge[s] bayat [allegiance]
to Osama bin Ladin.” Transcript of Arraignment & Motions Hearing at 26–27,
United States v. Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480 (E.D. Va. filed July 18, 2002)
(Criminal No. 01-455-A), available at http://web.elastic.org/~fche/mirrors/
cryptome.org/usa-v-zm-071082.htm. These are damning admissions in the face of
conspiracy charges. But Moussaoui has consistently denied that he had any role in
the September 11 plot. Transcript of Plea Hearing at 43, United States v.
Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480 (E.D. Va. filed July 25, 2002) (Criminal No. 01455-A), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/transcripts/
moussaoui072502.htm (stating “I did not know about September 11.”).
42. See Jonathan F. Lenzner, From a Pakistani Stationhouse to the Federal
Courthouse: A Confession’s Uncertain Journey in the U.S.-Led War on Terror, 12 CARDOZO
J. INT’L & COMP. LAW 297, 299–300 n.13 (2004) (noting that “[b]efore [Khalid
Sheikh] Mohammed’s capture, U.S. officials decided that they would not to [sic]
bring him to the United States to stand trial. Officials reasoned that obtaining
intelligence from the September 11 mastermind superseded the competing
interest in bringing him to justice in U.S. courts”) (citation omitted)). At least
one commentator argues that the use of overly aggressive interrogation tactics on
suspected terrorists (e.g., Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and John Walker Lindh) has
undermined the United States’ efforts to prosecute them in the United States due
to legal restraints and political hurdles. Id. at 299–300. See also Human Rights
Watch, The U.S.’s “Disappeared”: the CIA’s Long-Term “Ghost Detainees,” HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH BRIEFING PAPER, at 37–38 (Oct. 2004), available at
http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/usa/us1004/us1004.pdf (noting that CIA
torture techniques patently prohibited in criminal cases—such as water
submersion—are so severe that FBI officials have ordered its agents to preclude
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correctly being treated under what could be described as a new
intelligence paradigm.
III. PROBLEMS WITH THE CRIMINAL SYSTEM
A. A Boomerang to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
In a twist on how Al Qaeda used commercial aircraft against us
as missiles, this terrorist group could use our own rules concerning
criminal discovery. In particular, senior managers in Al Qaeda
could instruct their troops that in the event the foot soldiers are
captured and detained, they should weave false information into
their tales. They might do their best to exculpate Moussaoui and
other Al Qaeda members who are held in the U.S. criminal system.
That way, they could turn defeats into victories. Although Al
Qaeda might not train operatives in exclusive missions of
disinformation, it is not out of the question. If this network can
convince operatives to conduct suicide missions, its leaders
probably can convince their operatives to allow themselves to be
detained for the exclusive purpose of helping out a person whom
the leaders would describe as “brother Moussaoui.” From Al
Qaeda’s perspective, they can get more bang for their buck on pure
operations of destruction. More likely, as fallbacks to failed
missions, operatives might be instructed and trained in planting
false exculpatory information, and to do so in a subtle way to
43
maximize the chances that their captors believe the lies.
According to American experts, Al Qaeda’s tradecraft is good,
already including counter-surveillance and counter-interrogation
44
tactics.
Therefore, false exculpation would be a dangerous
themselves from taking part in high-level detainee interrogations so that the
officials would not be compromised in future criminal cases).
43. By contrast, I doubt that the allegiances are so strong in organized crime
groups or narcotics trafficking organizations that members would risk additional
perjury charges to exculpate other members. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1621, 1622, 1623
(2001) (providing five-year felonies relating respectively to perjury, suborning
perjury, and making false declarations before a grand jury or court); see also 18
U.S.C. § 1001 (2001) (applying broadly to all individuals who make false
statements “in any matter” before any of the three branches of government).
Unlike the situation with detainees held by intelligence agencies, in the situation
with mobsters and traffickers, law enforcement officials would be in a position to
assess and challenge the potential for false exculpatory information.
44. See, e.g., Arthur H. Garrison, The War on Terrorism on the Judicial Front, Part
II: The Courts Strike Back, 27 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 473, 513 (2004) (discussing the Al
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addition to their repertoire. Such disinformation missions are
more effective within the legal process when the United States
Government treats Al Qaeda members as law enforcement
problems rather than military problems.
45
We know that some detainees have passed on disinformation.
What is not clear, especially for those of us in the unclassified
sector, is whether these detainees have passed on disinformation in
Moussaoui’s case.
This disinformation possibility, of course, comes from Brady v.
46
Maryland and from Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
47
Procedure, which require prosecutors to provide exculpatory and
other discovery to criminal defendants. Even so, why Justice
Department prosecutors must turn over information from the files
of intelligence agencies is not obvious on the face of the rules. The
answer comes from the Justice Department’s broad view of which
Qaeda training manual, Military Studies in the Jihad Against the Tyrants, which
provides instructions on collecting intelligence, counter-interrogation techniques,
and means of communication during detention); John T. Nason, Conducting
Surveillance Operations, F.B.I. LAW ENFORCEMENT BULL., May 1, 2004, vol. 73, iss. 5, at
5, available at 2004 WL 69837618 (noting that “as part of Al-Qaeda specialized
training, operatives are instructed to follow meticulous operational security.
Tactics include conducting dry runs prior to becoming operational, using
secondary roads and public transportation to flush out surveillance, and
employing prearranged signals to communicate the absence or presence of
surveillance to other Al-Qaeda members”); Press Briefing, Judge Albert Gonzales
et
al.,
White
House
Counsel
(June
22,
2004),
available
at
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/06/print/20040622-14.html
(stating
that many of the detainees have been trained in counter-interrogation
techniques).
45. See, e.g., 9/11 REPORT, supra note 1, at 146 (“[a]ssessing the truth of
statements by these witnesses—sworn enemies of the United States—is
challenging”); see also id. at 488 n.4 (calling claims made by Khalid Sheikh
Mohammed that he contemplated assassinating Rabbi Meir Kahane when Kahane
lectured in Greensboro, North Carolina, “uncorroborated” and “mere bravado”)
(citing INTELLIGENCE REPORT, Interrogation of KSM, July 12, 2003); National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the U.S., 12th Public Hearing, (June 16, 2004),
available
at
http://www.9-11commission.gov/archive/hearing12/911Commission_Hearing_2004-06-16.htm (commenting that Khalid Sheikh
Mohammed, providing many of the details described in the 9/11 Report, may be a
source of disinformation).
46. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that the “suppression by the prosecution
of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the
evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith
or bad faith of the prosecution”).
47. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a) (prescribing what the government must disclose to
a defendant, such as the defendant’s own statement if the statement is in “the
government’s possession, custody, or control,” as well as photographs, documents
or books if they are “within the government’s possession, custody, or control”).
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agencies fall within the definition of “government.” The criminal
discovery rules require compliance from the government, not the
49
Justice Department. On some cases, the Justice Department has
determined that other agencies, such as the Central Intelligence
Agency or the National Security Agency, are so “aligned” with the
prosecution through the sharing of information and personnel that
prosecutors have a duty to search the files of those other agencies,
in addition to searching their own files, for information that is
50
responsive to defense requests and defense rights.
The classic
example for alignment is an espionage prosecution, say, of Aldrich
51
Ames. Yet the Justice Department has also seen alignments in
narcotics cases (e.g., the prosecution of the former Panamanian
leader, Manuel Noriega) and in most terrorism cases from the
52
“shoe bomber” Richard Reid to John Walker Lindh.
Al Qaeda scours our media for clues about refining their
tradecraft. Indeed it is reported that Osama Bin Laden stopped
using his cell phones after a newspaper article appeared in which
someone was too open about the United States Government’s
53
ability to monitor Bin Laden’s conversations.
An organization
48. See id. (using the phrase “the government must disclose”) (emphasis
added).
49. Id.
50. For a discussion of alignment, see, e.g., Jonathan M. Fredman, Intelligence
Agencies, Law Enforcement, and the Prosecution Team, 16 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 331,
347–49 (1998) (asserting that although alignment issues commonly arise in the
area of international terrorism—where intelligence and law enforcement
overlap—neither Congress nor the courts have yet to describe precise boundaries
of disclosure obligations under Brady, the Jencks Act (18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2001)),
and Rule 16). Within the Justice Department, the Counter-Espionage Section,
formerly called the Internal Security Section, is viewed as the one of the chief
purveyors of a broad view of alignment.
51. For further discussion of Aldrich Ames see PETE EARLEY, CONFESSIONS OF A
SPY: THE REAL STORY OF ALDRICH AMES 332 (1997).
52. See United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 1997)
(General Manuel Noriega was convicted in a jury trial and sentenced to
consecutive imprisonment terms of twenty, fifteen, and five years); see United
States v. Lindh, 227 F. Supp. 2d 565, 566 (E.D. Va. Oct. 4, 2002) (John Walker
Lindh pled guilty to supplying services to the Taliban and carrying an explosive
during the commission of a felony. Lindh was sentenced to 20 years in prison); see
United States v. Reid, 369 F.3d 619, 620 (1st Cir. 2004) (Richard Reid pled guilty
to eight terrorism-related offenses and was sentenced to life in prison).
53. See, e.g., Paul Haven, And He Never Comes Up for Air. Osama Bin Laden Has
Adopted a Low-Tech Approach, Using Pen and Ink Instead of Cell-Phones and Satellites,
Making Him Just about Impossible to Trace, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Aug. 15, 2004, at
4A (noting that Bin Laden has resorted to conveying messages via letter to remain
undetectable by the intelligence community); Michael Hirsh & John Barry, The
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that is crafty and evil enough to turn our planes back on us would
only have to surf the Internet for a few minutes to come up with
some of the ideas outlined in this article. Further, if Al Qaeda
wanted to bury the United States Government in paper they might
54
file a series of Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
requests
through front persons and front organizations for access to official
documents.
Almost surely, there is nothing in place in the discovery
process that allows prosecutors to ferret out false information from
detainees. Neither the prosecutors nor the court has had direct
55
access to the unnamed detainees. The prosecutors and the court
may have been told the names of the detainees in confidence, but

Hunt Heats Up; the Man in Charge of Catching Osama Bin Laden ‘Can Drive a Knife
through your Ribs in a Nanosecond.’ Inside the Search, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 15, 2004, at 46,
available at 2004 WL 62584640 (reporting that Bin Laden no longer uses electronic
means of communication).
54. By my reading, FOIA puts very few limits on who can make requests for
official information. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2001). For discussion of FOIA, see, e.g..
Themes Karalis, Foreign Policy and Separation of Powers Jurisprudence: Executive Orders
Regarding Export Administration Act Extension in Times of Lapse as a Political Question,
12 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 109, 110–21 (2004) (noting the historical
development, purposes, and exemptions of FOIA); Keith Anderson, Note, Is There
Still a “Sound Legal Basis?”: The Freedom of Information Act in the Post-9/11 World, 64
OHIO ST. L. J. 1605, 1605 (2003) (arguing that “courts should defer to the
decisions of law enforcement agencies to withhold information requests under
FOIA to promote greater homeland protection”).
55. Judge Brinkema denied Moussaoui’s motions for pretrial access and the
trial appearance of unnamed detainees and ordered that the “United States make
[undisclosed persons] available for trial testimony in the form of a videotaped
deposition pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 15 under [undisclosed] conditions.” See
Order, United States v. Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480 (E.D. Va. filed Jan. 31,
2002)
(Criminal
No.
01-455-A),
available
at
http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/1:01-cr-00455/docs/68180/1.pdf.
However, the prosecution refused to comply with the court order and offered to
provide Moussaoui with mere written summations of statements made by the
detainees to government interrogators. United States v. Moussaoui, No. CR. 01455-A, 2003 WL 21277161, at *1 (E.D. Va. May 15, 2003). As a result of this blatant
refusal to comply, Judge Brinkema sanctioned the prosecution by precluding it
from seeking the death penalty or “making any argument, or offering any
evidence, suggesting that [Moussaoui] had any involvement in, or knowledge of,
the September 11 attacks.” United States v. Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480, 487
(E.D. Va. 2003). On appeal, the Fourth Circuit vacated the sanctions imposed on
the government and further held that although the government’s currently
proposed substitutions for detainees’ deposition were inadequate, some form of
redacted written summaries of detainees’ testimony would be sufficient—thereby
evading the manifest security risk posed by direct and/or videotaped deposition
testimony without contravening the Sixth Amendment.
United States v.
Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 479, 482 (4th Cir. 2004).
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56

not where they were being held. The prosecutors and the court
seem to be relying on cables or summaries of the interrogations,
possibly done by American interrogators from various U.S.
57
agencies, or possibly done with the assistance of foreign officials.
The interrogators of the detainees do not answer to the
prosecutors and do not share their training, their outlook, or their
mission. As much as it has become fashionable to speak about
cooperation between law enforcement and intelligence agencies,
about breaking down the stovepipes, about a national intelligence
czar, there are still many areas of separation and disconnect. Even
the 9/11 Commission, which was able to convince the Government
to acknowledge the names of some Al Qaeda detainees, was not
58
allowed direct access to these detainees.
These aggressive
interrogations are the keys to the Bush Administration’s crown
jewels.
In the Moussaoui case, the Justice Department prosecutors,
assisted by teams from the Counter-Terrorism Section at the
Criminal Division, have spent hundreds of hours reviewing
thousands of documents at several U.S. agencies to comply with
their view of discovery obligations. Much of the back and forth
between Judge Brinkema in the district court and the judges at the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has related to defining the

56. In covering hearings in the Moussaoui case, the media have been diligent
in determining which high-value detainees Moussaoui wants access to and where
they are located. At times, this diligence simply applies to filling in blanks in the
redacted filings. See Order, United States v. Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480 (E.D.
Va.
Jan.
31,
2003)
(Criminal
No.
01-455-A),
available
at
http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/1:01-cr-00455/docs/68180/1.pdf (stating
that “defense motions [redacted] are DENIED to the extent that they request
pretrial access to [redacted] DENIED to the extent the motions seek to compel
the trial appearances of [redacted] and GRANTED to the extent that they seek to
compel the trial appearances of [redacted]”).
57. See United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 460–62 n.14 (4th Cir. 2004)
(noting that the prosecution team does not receive reports from the intelligence
community which are specifically tailored to the Moussaoui prosecution; rather,
the reports merely contain information that has general foreign intelligence
value).
58. See David Johnston & Don Van Natta Jr., Threats & Responses: The
Interrogations; Account of Plot Sets Off Debate Over Credibility, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2004,
at A1 (reporting that the “[9/11] commission staff members . . . did not have
direct access to any detainee and had based their account on intelligence reports
drawn from the interrogations”); J. Scott Orr, 9/11 Panel Sends Questions to Captured
Al Qaeda Terrorists, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, NJ), May 12, 2004, at 9 (noting that the
9/11 Commission was merely allowed to pose questions to detainees, rather than
have direct access).
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contours of Moussaoui’s right of access to detainees whose names
the U.S. Government has not even acknowledged. This access
derives from discovery rules, Fifth Amendment due process
protections, and Sixth Amendment trial rights.
So armed,
Moussaoui’s lawyers have been somewhat successful in convincing
the court that Moussaoui has some right to the classified
59
information in the case. This right applies to both the guilt and
60
penalty phases of the trial.
In several opinions, Judge Brinkema has noted the acute
importance of Moussaoui’s right to information from the detainees
61
since the Government has made this a death penalty case.
Further, Judge Brinkema has suggested that if the Government
would like to protect classified information by cutting corners on
62
legal process, it should do so in a different forum. Although the
judge cannot ensure the integrity of the legal process in all places,
namely military tribunals, she can make sure that Article III courts
63
keep to the old standards.
Even the opinions from the
conservative Fourth Circuit have only questioned the scope of
59. In the current posture of the case, Moussaoui is said to have a right to
classified summaries of exculpatory information that the detainees have given, but
not a right to present questions directly to the detainees themselves. See United
States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 479 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding that redacted
summaries are a sufficient proxy for detainees’ deposition testimony).
60. Id.
61. See, e.g., United States v. Moussaoui, No. CR. 01-455-A, 2003 WL
21263699, at *5 (E.D. Va. Mar. 10, 2003) (stating that Moussaoui has a compelling
right to receive a fair trial); United States v. Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480, 486–
87 (E.D. Va. 2003) (noting that Moussaoui’s access to detainees is necessary to
procure reliable evidence, which is indispensable to the “determination that death
is the appropriate punishment”) (citation omitted)); United States v. Moussaui,
282 F. Supp. 2d at 482 (stating that “the United States may not maintain this
capital prosecution while simultaneously refusing to produce witnesses who could,
at minimum, help [Moussaoui] avoid a sentence of death”) (citations omitted)).
62. United States v. Moussaoui, No. CR 01-455-A, 2003 WL 21263699, at *6
(E.D. Va. filed Dec. 11, 2001) (“To the extent that the United States seeks a
categorical, “wartime” exception to the Sixth Amendment, it should reconsider
whether the civilian criminal courts are the appropriate forum in which to
prosecute alleged terrorists captured in the context of an ongoing war.”); see also
Associated Press, Judge Jibes Feds in Moussaoui Trial (Apr. 4, 2003), at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/04/24/attack/main550876.shtml
(discussing Judge Brinkema’s concern over the extent to which the United States
has classified court documents).
63. This notion of keeping the existing constitutional system free from the
taints of emergency accommodations has support at more theoretical levels. See,
e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029, 1047–49
(2004) (proposing that a special grant of emergency powers to the Executive be
subject to increasing super-majorities in the Congress).
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Moussaoui’s constitutional rights, not their existence. In tandem
with the district court, the Fourth Circuit’s debate has been focused
on what form the discovery and the evidence should take, with the
Government pushing for watered down versions of detainee
statements when it has not been able to convince the Court that
Moussaoui has no right to that classified information.
The Justice Department has provided Moussaoui’s defense
team, but not Moussaoui himself, with classified discovery. These
defense lawyers have security clearances that require them to
handle the classified information with great care, and these defense
lawyers have signed agreements with the United States promising
not to share this information with Moussaoui.
65
The Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) does not
solve the problem of greymail that lurks behind the Moussaoui
66
case. Greymail is the process by which the prosecution is forced
to drop charges or to limit charges because of the defendant’s use
of classified information or the threat of using classified
67
information. CIPA merely ensures that these problems are dealt
68
with pre-trial rather than in the middle of trial. Under CIPA, it is
very unlikely that the Court would require the Government to turn
69
over raw intelligence cables or raw intercepts. Under section 3,
the prosecutors have had the Court enter protective orders for
70
Under
handling classified information in the Moussaoui case.
section 4, concerning classified discovery, and under section 6,
concerning the use of classified information at trial, CIPA gives the
Government the right to propose summaries and substitutions for
71
the classified information.
A common method of substitution,
64. See United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 482 (4th Cir. 2004)
(“Because the Government will not allow Moussaoui to have contact with the
witnesses, we must provide a remedy adequate to protect Moussaoui’s
constitutional rights.”); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 464–75 (4th Cir.
2003).
65. 18 U.S.C. app. 3 (2001).
66. See Cameron Stracher, Eyes Tied Shut: Litigating for Access under CIPA in the
Government’s “War on Terror,” 48 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 173 (2004) (containing a
discussion of CIPA and graymail in the Moussaoui context).
67. United States v. Lee, 90 F. Supp. 2d 1324, 1328 & n. 5 (D.N.M. 2000).
68. Id.
69. 18 U.S.C. app. 3 (2001).
70. Id.
71. See 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 4.
The court . . . may authorize the United States to delete specified items of
classified information from documents to be made available to the
defendant through discovery under the Federal Rules of Criminal
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familiar to many through documents that are made public in
response to FOIA requests or through government declassification
programs, is redactions of the original sources. Yet, even after
summaries and substitutions, if the U.S. Government cannot bear
the pain of having to turn over classified discovery to a terrorist, the
72
only remedy is to dismiss the prosecution.
At least in the criminal realm, the rights of defendants trump
73
the government’s need for secrecy. This is the specter that has
haunted the Moussaoui prosecutors from the beginning of their
case, the leaks and rumors from officials at the White House and
the Defense Department who have said that whenever it becomes
clear that the price is too high for dealing with Moussaoui in an
74
Article III court, he will be swept over to the military system.
There, a defendant’s rights are more limited and the ability to
75
protect classified information more ample.
Although the back and forth between the Rumsfelds and the
Ashcrofts is well-suited to Washington parlor games, the thesis of
this article is that reasonable people have known all along that
Moussaoui belongs in military detention. It is time for those
people to come out of their closets. Under a military paradigm,
Moussaoui would be interrogated and his computer and
belongings searched without any hand-wringing.
Wherever
76
Moussaoui is detained, he may not be tortured. The treatment
Procedure, to substitute a summary of the information for such classified
documents, or to substitute a statement admitting relevant facts that the
classified information would tend to prove.
Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 6(c)(1)(a)–(b) (“[T]he United States may move that
. . . the court order the substitution for such classified information of a statement
admitting relevant facts that the specific classified information would tend to
prove or the substitution for such classified information of a summary of the
specific classified information.”).
72. This dismissal requires the Attorney General’s approval. See 18 U.S.C.
app. 3 § 12.
73. Lee, 90 F.Supp at 1328 n.5 (noting that a criminal defendant has a
“fundamental right” to cross examine witnesses for the prosecution); see also
United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 12 (1953) (stating that it is “unconscionable”
to invoke a government privilege in order to deprive the accused anything which
might be material to his or her defense).
74. CBS, Military Tribunal for 6 Suspects (July 3, 2003), at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/07/18/attack/main563920.shtml.
75. See MIL. R. EVID. 505(a) in 2 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG ET AL., MILITARY RULES
OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 5–52 (5th ed. 2003) (“Classified information is privileged
from disclosure if disclosure would be detrimental to the national security.”).
76. Torture violates domestic law and international law. See United Nations
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
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that prisoners received at Abu Gharib prison in Iraq is the work of
hoods and hooligans.
It is not the work of intelligence
professionals who, through skill, patience, and often good luck, pry
information out of people to disrupt terrorist plots and to protect
the innocent.
B. Faretta Issues
At one stage during the Moussaoui saga, Judge Brinkema
allowed Moussaoui to represent himself. She held lengthy hearings
on this issue in which she strived to meet the Constitutional
77
standards under Faretta v. California.
As Moussaoui learned,
however, the right to proceed pro se is not absolute, and, in
response to his long pattern of antics and abuse, Judge Brinkema
78
revoked Moussaoui’s right to represent himself.
Moussaoui probably does not realize all the opportunities he
had to use the criminal system back against our Government.
Otherwise, he would have been able to put more pressure on the
prosecution by keeping his mouth shut and insisting that the
classified discovery be shared directly with him. As much as
possible, he would have reduced the role of “cleared” standby
counsel as intermediaries and repositories of classified information.
The intelligence agencies, more narrow in their view of law
enforcement-intelligence alignment, would have been outraged at
the possibility of having to share information with someone the
Government considers a terrorist.
Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, Annex 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 197, U.N.
Doc. A/39/51 (1984), available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/
instree/h2catoc.htm; see 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A (2001). This Act went into
effect October 26, 2001, and contains prohibitions against torture, as well as
setting serious penalties for any violations. Id.; see also Memorandum from Daniel
Levin, Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel,
to James B. Comey, Deputy Attorney General (Dec. 30, 2004), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/dagmemo.pdf. This memo, known as the “Torture
Memo,” contains a lengthy analysis of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A, the use of torture,
and further clarification and analysis of the phrase “severe pain.” Id.
77. 422 U.S. 806 (1975). Faretta is the leading case for the right to proceed
pro se.
78. See id. at 834 n.46 (“[T]he trial judge may terminate self-representation by
a defendant who deliberately engages in serious and obstructionist misconduct.”);
Order, United States v. Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480 (E.D. Va. filed Nov. 11,
2003)
(Criminal
No.
01-455-A),
available
at
http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/1:01-cr-00455/docs/694120/0.pdf (“[The
defendant’s] pleadings include contemptuous language that would never be
tolerated from an attorney, and will no longer be tolerated from this defendant.”).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2005

19

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 4 [2005], Art. 4
RADSAN (REVISED)

1436

4/25/2005 1:15:51 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:4

With American lawyers on Moussaoui’s defense team, there is
some room for compromises between the Justice Department and
the intelligence agencies about what is turned over to the defense.
But if Moussaoui were on his own, wearing both the hats of
defendant and of defense counsel, the room for compromise
would be much smaller. Again, as a part of their tradecraft, Al
Qaeda might instruct operatives to maintain their composure and
to insist on self-representation if they find themselves as criminal
defendants in our courts. Again, such perverse scenarios tend to
exist when terrorists are viewed as criminals with broad rights to
discovery from the Government, rather than combatants with
limited procedural rights before military tribunals.
C. Death Penalty Complications
For the Government to seek the death penalty in Moussaoui’s
case, no matter the forum, creates complications. Yet these
complications would not be as great in a military tribunal because a
combatant is entitled to fewer procedural rights before a military
79
tribunal. That is another reason to move Moussaoui to a military
tribunal.
Beyond the details of the Moussaoui case, some broad
observations about the death penalty in terrorism cases are
appropriate. When a statement is repeated enough, whether true
or not, it often takes on the appearance of truth. Terrorists, it is
said, are not deterred by the prospect of penalties in the criminal
80
system. Terrorists, who are recruited for suicide missions, it is also
81
said, are not deterred by the prospect of a death penalty. These
statements, however, may not shine true on closer examination.
It is quite possible that a terrorist recruit may not flinch at the
prospect of death in a successful martyr mission. The terrorist’s
success will often be consistent with posters and videos and other
propaganda that were used to recruit him, with selected quotations
from the Koran, and with distorted visions of martyrs who rise to
82
paradise covered in flowers, banners, and praise. The would-be
79. See supra text accompanying note 61.
80. Susan M. McGarvey, Missed Opportunity? The Affirmation of the Death Penalty
in the AEDPA: Extradition Scenario, 24 J. LEGIS. 99, 105 (1998).
81. Paul Butler, Forward: Terrorism and Unilateralism: Lessons from and for,
Criminal Law, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 14 (2002).
82. See Jack Kelley, The Secret World of Suicide Bombers, USA TODAY, Jun, 26,
2001, at 01A, available at 2001 WLNR 3776830.
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martyr may not be thoroughly consistent or logical, but he is
usually not so far gone that he does not recognize that his enemies
do not share his values and may punish him if caught. The wouldbe martyr may hesitate at the thought of languishing in the infidel’s
83
prisons or being executed in defeat by the infidel’s sword. His
defeat might then be something to hide or to explain, both to
himself and to his community. He may experience shame.
Such observations are not intended to open up a full debate
84
about the propriety of the death penalty.
By putting aside a
moral, ethical, and philosophical debate, this article, in an agnostic
mode, modestly assumes that if anyone deserves to be executed it is
the terrorist who kills or aims to kill innocents. The terrorist’s
attack is a fundamental attack on civilization, a fundamental breach
85
of our most basic norms. If Moussaoui, for example, would read
his own holy book carefully he would discover a passage that
86
indicates that he who kills one person kills all of humanity. There
is the clear condemnation of his evil thoughts and evil deeds.
Professor Thomas Michael McDonnell, in contrast to this
article, argues that the death penalty is counter-productive in
combating terrorism because this harsh punishment creates more
hatred for the United States and, in turn, more terrorist recruits
87
against us.
Unlike Professor McDonnell, this article is most
concerned with the initial ripples from our use of the death penalty
in terrorism cases, that is, the effects on Justice Department
investigations and prosecutions. Whether the American use of the
83. See id.
84. See Richard C. Dieter, International Influence on the Death Penalty in the U.S.,
in 80 FOREIGN SERVICE J. 31 (Steven Alan Honley ed., Oct. 2003), available at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=17&did=806;
Norman
L.
Greene et al., Capital Punishment in the Age of Terrorism, 41 CATH. LAW. 187 (2002);
Senator Arlen Specter, The Time Has Come for a Terrorist Death Penalty Law, 95 DICK.
L. REV. 739 (1991).
85. The disease of terrorism was diagnosed at least by the 19th century. For a
literary diagnosis of the symptoms and the effects of such nihilism, we can refer to
Fyodor Dostoyevsky’s works, particularly Crime and Punishment and The Devils.
FYODOR DOSTOYEVSKY, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT (Constance Garnett, trans., P.F.
Collier & Son) (1917); FYODOR DOSTOEVSKY, THE DEVILS (Constance Garnett,
trans., St. Petersburg) (1873).
86. The Dinner Table 5:32 (The Qur’an). By now, it should be clear that I am
one of those who believe that Al Qaeda and other Islamic fanatics have hijacked a
great religion.
87. See generally Thomas Michael McDonnell, The Death Penalty – An Obstacle to
the “War against Terrorism”?, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 353, 389–406 (Mar. 2004)
(discussing policy considerations and repercussions of executing Al Qaeda
members).
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death penalty creates more recruits for Al Qaeda or creates more
animosity against us in the “Muslim World” is not clear. The
analysis of these outer ripples often depends on impressions as
much as on data. Further, the notion of a unified Muslim World
88
can easily be deconstructed. After all, the death penalty is not
contrary to Islam; the Muslim World, if one exists, is familiar with
the death penalty in countries that have both Islamic and non89
Islamic governments.
A full discussion concerning retribution and deterrence,
common arguments in favor of the death penalty, is also beyond
the scope of this article. To be sure, a terrorist may not be deterred
by the death penalty in the same way that murderers, kidnappers,
or other potential criminals are. The terrorist has a political and
religious aspect to his crime that does not usually exist in other
90
violent criminals.
But these observations are not enough to
dismiss any effect from the death penalty on the grounds of
retribution and deterrence. To develop the notion of just
retribution requires a philosophical analysis that has been left
aside. The general deterrence from the death penalty can also be
questioned, but the specific deterrence of executing a terrorist
rather than incarcerating him is clear: The executed terrorist, who
cannot escape from prison, is obviously less of a threat to us than a
terrorist who is sentenced to life in prison.
Even so, a more instrumental attack on the death penalty in
terrorism cases can be made. The costs of the death penalty,
whether implemented by a federal district court or a military
tribunal, may not be worth the benefits in counter-terrorism policy.
The Justice Department’s decision to seek the death penalty in
91
the Moussaoui case was political.
The American public was
88. In fairness, Professor McDonnell does recognize the limits of the data. In
the absence of facts, he adopts the reasonable position of searching for good
analogies, for example, the British policies in dealing with terrorism in Northern
Ireland. These analogies, of course, only go as far as the factual similarities
between the two situations being compared. See, e.g., id. at 401–10 (discussing
making martyrs out of the executed).
89. Saudi Arabia, a U.S. ally, and Iran, part of President Bush’s “axis of evil,”
are examples of Islamic governments with the death penalty.
Amnesty
International, at http://web.amnesty.org/pages/deathpenalty-countries-eng (last
visited March 29, 2005). Jordan, a U.S. ally, and Libya, a repentant U.S. foe, are
examples of secular governments in the Muslim World with the death penalty. Id.
90. See Kelley, supra note 82.
91. A political decision, per se, is not negative. A political decision is negative
to the extent that it does not contribute to good strategy.
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outraged after the attacks on our soil. For many, the spirit of the
mob was stirred up; they wanted someone to pay for these horrors,
and, in Old Testament tradition, they expected blood to be repaid
with blood. The families of the victims have been an effective lobby
on the Government, pushing for inquiries into the intelligence
failures and putting pressure on the Justice Department to exact
92
the ultimate price from the “evildoers.”
Attorney General
Ashcroft, already a broad supporter of the death penalty, probably
did not need any prodding. As the nation’s symbolic executioner,
93
he was pleased to fulfill these bloody demands.
In our politics, once a public official promises something, it is
difficult for him to back off that promise. The Justice Department
seeks Moussaoui’s conviction and execution, and nothing less than
that may satisfy many parts of a bloodthirsty American public. The
decision to seek the death penalty has come at a cost, not to the
Attorney General, but to the line prosecutors that must deliver the
conviction and the execution. As the prosecutors know, the death
penalty creates its own complications in a criminal case. For this
reason, after the Moussaoui case became eligible for the death
penalty, another prosecutor, David Novak, was added to the
government’s team because of his experience in navigating
94
through the procedural obstacles. Without the death penalty, one
fewer prosecutor would be needed at counsel’s table and many
other problems would be avoided.
Part of the reason that Judge Brinkema has been so broad in
her definition of what must be turned over to Moussaoui in
95
discovery is the looming threat of the death penalty over him.
92. See David Firestone & James Risen, Threats and Responses: The Hearing;
White House, In Shift, Backs Inquiry on 9/11, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2002, at A1,
available at 2002 WLNR 4068133; Christine Haughney, 9/11 Survivors Give Panel a
Wish List; Review and Future Remedies Urged, WASH. POST, Apr. 1, 2003, at A10,
available at 2003 WL 17424833; Tasha Robertson, OK for 9/11 Probe Followed
Families’ Steadfast Lobbying, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 27, 2002, at A1, available at 2002
WL 4151231; Pat Wingert, Bonds of Steel; Keeping Faith: The Families of 9/11 Victims
are a Mighty Force. Ask the White House, the Commission – or Anyone Else in Their Way,
NEWSWEEK, Apr. 5, 2004, at 30, available at 2004 WLNR 3639708.
93. Attorney General Transcript, News Conference, DOJ to Seek Death Penalty
Against Moussaoui (Mar. 28, 2002), at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2002/
032802newsconferenceaginmiamifloridamoussaoui.htm.
94. This was made clear to me in conversations with both Rob Spencer and
David Novak in 2004.
95. Mem. Op., United States v. Moussaui, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480 (E.D. Va. filed
Mar.
10,
2003)
(Criminal
No.
01-455-A),
available
at
http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts/1:01-cr-00455/docs/68354/1.pdf.
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When death is a possibility, the stakes are higher, and the courts err
96
on the side of disclosure. That is how it should be. The Justice
Department accepts this. The American public should know this.
If the death penalty is not part of the case, the Justice Department
would be in a much better position to convince the courts that the
government, for national security reasons, does not have to turn
over classified discovery. And even for the classified items that
must be turned over, the Justice Department could make stronger
arguments for broad redactions and general summaries.
The United States is one of few developed countries that still
97
uses the death penalty. Most of our allies in Europe have banned
98
this penalty. In an international struggle against terrorism, the
United States needs cooperation from all parts of the globe. This
cooperation takes the direct form of contributing troops to
campaigns in Afghanistan but also takes the subtle form of passing
on leads and intelligence from the law enforcement agencies and
intelligence services. For example, in investigating the September
11 attacks, we asked for and received assistance from France,
Germany, and Spain, countries that do not permit the death
99
penalty. In their negotiations with the Justice Department, the
French, German, and Spanish governments put conditions on the
information they shared with us in the Moussaoui case once they
100
learned that we were seeking his execution. Further, the French,
German, and Spanish governments and other governments may
self-filter, not even telling us about useful information they have in
their files because of their opposition to our use of the death
penalty. These are not theoretical possibilities. These are facts that
contradict our counter-terrorism policies.
A complication for this analysis is the possibility that our allies
are posturing on the death penalty. For their public, they may be
96. See id.
97. The Death Penalty Worldwide, at http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/
A0777460.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2005). Some other countries that still use the
death penalty are Bahrain, Lebanon, Oman, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen,
putting us in strange company. Id.
98. Id. France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Spain have all outlawed
the death penalty. Id.
99. See 9/11 REPORT, supra note 1, at 274 (French); see id. at 494–99 nn.64–
132 (German); see id. at 530 n.145 (Spanish).
100. See Seymour M. Hersh, The Twentieth Man: Has the Justice Department
Mishandled the Case Against Zacarias Moussaoui?, THE NEW YORKER, Sept. 30, 2002, at
56; Michael Isikoff, et al., Should This Man Die?, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 8, 2002, at 30,
available at 2002 WLNR 8854294.
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open about their opposition to the death penalty. In their private
meetings with U.S. authorities, say with a political officer in the
U.S. embassy in Spain or with an FBI legal attaché in Paris, they
may be very cooperative and less ideological about the death
penalty. For those without access to classified information and for
those who once had security clearances but are not allowed to draw
on their prior access because of continuing agreements on
protecting classified information, the best we can do is guess what
101
lies in the wilderness of mirrors.
In crass and simple terms, is
Franco-American cooperation on counter-terrorism at all affected
by the possibility of Moussaoui’s execution? Yes, I argue, to a
limited extent. But when France, a Western democracy, more
secular than the United States, is in the same existential bind as us
in a clash of civilizations with Islamic extremists, does the plight of
one French citizen of Moroccan descent matter as much to the
French Government as the two-way exchanges of information and
personnel that are necessary to both American and French
102
security?
Effective intelligence services do not function in
isolation. Further, our allies’ opposition to our use of the death
penalty may limit their extraditions of individuals to United States
jurisdiction, but may not limit other forms of their cooperation.
101. Because of agreements I made upon entering the Central Intelligence
Agency, I submitted this article for “pre-publication review” with so-called
classification experts there. Even so, the views in this article are mine, not theirs.
102. Although tempted, I am not saying that the French are more two-faced
than Americans. I do note that with a higher percentage of Muslims to their
general population than the United States, the French seem more concerned
about a Muslim backlash in their country. Between 5 and 10% of the population
in France is Muslim, compared to 1% in the United States. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, available at http://www.cia.gov/cia/
publications/factbook/fields/2122.html (last updated Feb. 10, 2005). In a move
that many French citizens supported as a defense of the secular values of the
French Republic, the French Government has prohibited the veil and other items
of religious clothing in the public schools. This led to demonstrations by Muslims
in France and to angry statements from the Islamic Republic of Iran, among other
governments in the Muslim World, and to further threats from Usama Bin Laden
and other members of Al Qaeda. Caroline Faraj, Bin Laden Deputy Slams Scarf Ban
(Feb.
24,
2004),
at
http://cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/02/24/
qaeda.headscarves/; BBC News, Iran Urges French Scarf Rethink (Dec. 23, 2003), at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/middle_east/3343119.stm;
Elaine
Sciolino, French Muslims Protest Rule Against Scarves, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2004, at
110, available at 2004 WLNR 5812462. The ban has also been used as leverage by
hostage takers in Iraq. Two journalists held captive urged the French government
to repeal the ban in exchange for their lives. Elaine Sciolino, Hostages Urge France
to Repeal its Scarf Ban, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2004, at A8, available at 2004 WLNR
5532754.
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This cooperation, in short, is not all or nothing. Finally, it is useful
to remember that we did not need French permission to arrest
Moussaoui, and the French Government has not been too vocal in
its demands that we return him to his French homeland so that
103
French authorities can decide what to do with him.
The death penalty, whether sought in a federal district court
or in a military tribunal, is counter-productive when the lost
benefits of international cooperation outweigh any deterrence and
104
retribution benefits from seeking the death penalty.
That is
clear. Rather than play to public perceptions, good leaders would
explain these realities to the American public and to the families
who lost loved ones in the September 11 attacks.
D. The Costs of Special Protection
Wherever Moussaoui is housed, he should be isolated from Al
Qaeda members, inside or outside the facility, to prevent his escape
and to prevent the free flow of information to and from him.
Therefore, another advantage of a military tribunal in Moussaoui’s
case is that he can be more effectively isolated in a military facility
than in criminal detention. Military bases, more so than detention
centers and prisons, are designed and managed to combat military
105
“Force protection,” in short, is more the military’s
threats.
106
specialty than law enforcement’s.
103. By contrast, some Governments have been very vocal about having their
citizens released from Guantanamo Bay. See Neil A. Lewis, Bowing to Ally, Bush to
Rethink Tribunals for British Subjects, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2003, at A3, available at 2003
WLNR 5663871 (discussing the reconsideration of cases involving Australian and
British detainees); Associated Press, Saudis Seek Control of Saudi Detainees, Jan. 29,
2002,
at
http://www.dailyherald.com/special/waronterrorism/
story.asp?intID=3728559 (discussing the urging by Saudi Arabia that Saudi
detainees be turned over for questioning at home).
104. In my calculus, I assume that the philosophical arguments about the
death penalty even themselves out so that the calculations can be limited to
instrumental effects. I do recognize the inherent limits to these data and
calculations, such that I, too, am engaged in impressionism as much as science.
105. See Department of Defense Directive 2310.1, August 18, 1994, available at
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/d23101_081894/d23101p.pdf
(persons captured or detained by the U.S. Military “shall normally be handed over
for safeguarding to the U.S. Army Police, or to detainee collecting points or other
holding facilities operated by U.S. Military police”).
106. See Commander Gregory P. Noone, et al., Prisoners of War in the 21st
Century: Issues in Modern Warfare, 50 NAV. L. REV. 1, 10–11 (2004). Under the
Geneva Conventions, enemy prisoners must be removed from the battlefield as
soon as possible and protected at all times from physical and mental harm. Id.
Further, enemy prisoners must be held in a place sufficiently outside the combat

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol31/iss4/4

26

Radsan: The Moussaoui Case: The Mess from Minnesota
RADSAN (REVISED)

2005]

4/25/2005 1:15:51 PM

THE MESS FROM MINNESOTA

1443

At the Alexandria Detention Center, Moussaoui is subject to
Special Administrative Measures (SAMS), which are authorized in
107
the regulations of the Bureau of Prisons.
These SAMS, which
have also been placed on espionage defendants in the past, severely
restrict Moussaoui’s interactions with other prisoners, with his
108
defense counsel, and with the rest of the world. In effect, he lives
in a bubble within a bubble. The public is not able to determine
the specific costs from these extra security measures, but it is safe to
say that Moussaoui is costing the taxpayers far more than the
typical criminal defendant who is housed in the general population
of pre-trial detainees. The restrictions on the flow of documents
and visitors are designed, in part, to prevent Moussaoui from
leaking any classified information to which he obtains access,
properly or improperly, and to prevent messages from being passed
109
to and from other members of his terrorist group.
110
He seems
Moussaoui’s isolation has taken a toll on him.
much thinner in court than in the photographs taken close to the
time of his arrest.
Moussaoui’s isolation and his repeated
statements that his court-appointed lawyers are part of the
government plot against him have affected the quality of his
111
defense.
For a flavor of Moussaoui’s mental processes, we can
zone of danger. Id.
107. 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(a) (2005).
108. Id. Special administrative measures may include, but are not limited to,
limiting correspondence, visits, interviews with representatives of the news media,
and use of the telephone. Id.
109. Under the Bureau of Prisons procedures, the special administrative
measures may be renewed annually. 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(c) (2005).
110. Earlier in the process, Judge Brinkema determined that Moussaoui was
competent to face trial. United States v. Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480 (E.D. Va.
filed
Dec.
11,
2001)
(Criminal
No.
01-183),
at
http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/1:01-cr-00455/DocketSheet.html.
The
standard for competency is low, mainly the ability to assist defense counsel, such
that it is possible for Moussauoi to suffer from some mental illness while being
competent. See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (describing the
test for competency as whether the defendant has “sufficient present ability to
consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and
whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings
against him”); see also Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 397–400 (1993) (holding
that the standard for pleading guilty or waiving the right to counsel is the same as
the standard for competency to stand trial). The definitions of mental illness that
mental health experts use are quite broad. See, e.g., DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS, AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION (4th ed.,
textual rev. 2000).
111. See Sam A. Schmidt & Joshua L. Dratel, Turning the Tables: Using the
Government’s Secrecy and Security Arsenal for the Benefit of the Client in Terrorism
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consult the numerous filings he made while pro se.
Many of
these filings are handwritten, displaying Moussaoui’s bizarre sense
of humor and a vitriol for almost everyone connected to the case,
including Judge Brinkema, the prosecutors, and his defense
113
lawyers. Isolation in a military facility, of course, would also take
Prosecutions, 48 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 69, 75 (2004). Dratel represented one of the
defendants in the trial in the Southern District of New York related to the
bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Id. at 69. As further
proof of the limited circle of lawyers involved in national security cases, one of the
embassy bombing prosecutors, Ken Karas, was added to the Moussaoui
prosecution team soon after the indictment.
112. See Defendant's Motion, United States v. Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480
(E.D. Va. filed Aug. 1, 2002) (Criminal No. 01-455-A), available at
http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/1:01-cr-00455/docs/67010/0.pdf
(Moussaoui titled the motion: “Motion for a 1st Class Ticket on 747-400 Out of the
United States Now!”); Defendant’s Motion, United States v. Moussaoui, 282 F.
Supp. 2d 480 (E.D. Va. filed July 3, 2002) (Criminal No. 01-455-A), available at
http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/1:01-cr-00455/docs/66590/0.pdf
(Moussaoui titled the motion: “Motion to Have Independent Electronic
Surveillance Forensic Expert to Examine and Test a Square Fan ‘Mysteriously’ Left
on My Car”); Defendant's Motion, United States v. Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480
(E.D. Va. filed July 1, 2002) (Criminal No. 01-455-A), available at
http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/1:01-cr-00455/docs/66489/0.pdf
(Moussaoui titled the motion: “Motion to Stop Leonie Brinkema DJ playing Game
with My Life”). The Government obtained the right to review these filings before
they were made public to ensure that they did not contain secret messages to
other members of Moussaoui’s terrorist network.
113. See Defendant's Motion, United States v. Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480
(E.D. Va. filed July 10, 2002) (Criminal No. 01-455-A), available at
http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/1:01-cr-00455/docs/66741/1.pdf
(Moussaoui titled the motion: “Motion to Stop the Cynical Comedy, Parody of
Justice Directed by DJ Brinkema”). “DJ” is Moussaoui’s abbreviation for “death
judge,” a title he uses often to refer to Judge Brinkema. Defendant’s Motion,
United States v. Moussaui, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480 (E.D. Va. filed July 1, 2003)
(Criminal
No.
69065),
http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts/1:01-cr00455/doca/69065/1.pdf.
For a sample attack on the prosecutors, see
Defendant’s Motion, United States v. Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480 (E.D. Va.
filed
July
11,
2003)
(Criminal
No.
01-455-A),
available
at
http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/1:01-cr-00455/docs/68933/1.pdf
(Moussaoui titled the motion: “Motion to Emergency Strike by the Natural Born
Terrorist, ZM, to Have a Dual [sic] Shoot Out with Chief Liar Ashcroft in Lieonie
[sic] Court Yard.”). And for an attack on Moussaoui’s own lawyers, see
Defendant's Motion, United States v. Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480 (E.D. Va.
filed
May
12,
2003)
(Criminal
No.
01-455-A),
available
at
http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/1:01-cr-00455/docs/68749/1.pdf
(Moussaoui titled the motion: “Motion to Counter Dirty Insider Dealing by Fat
Megalo Dunham for his Chief Pay Persecution Master Ashcroft (a/k/a United
Satan Chief Liar) and To Have Fat Megalo Out of 9/11 Circus Trial”). Dunham is
chief defense attorney Frank Dunham, who Moussaoui repeatedly refers to as
either “fat” or “blood sucker.” United States v. Moussaui, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480
(E.D.
Va.
filed
Aug.
7,
2003)
(Criminal
No.
68876),
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a toll on Moussaoui. The toll on the taxpayer, however, may not be
as severe.
E. Taking Away the Soapbox
Another reason to choose a military tribunal over a federal
district court is to deprive Moussaoui, as much as constitutional, of
a platform for his propaganda. The conflict against Al Qaeda is as
much a battle of ideas as a battle of arms. A military tribunal, with
strict limits on public access, would put an appropriate muzzle on
Moussaoui without taking away his rights to fair process.
Otherwise, even without cameras in the courtroom, a trial in
federal district court with film crews on the steps of the courthouse
and reporters inside would create a media frenzy in which
Moussaoui’s words of defiance would be replayed and distorted all
over the world. This is a soapbox that should be taken away.
F.

Material Witness Statute

Another problem with treating Moussaoui as a law
114
enforcement problem rather a military problem was that it
placed stress on the tools of criminal law. Square pegs were
pounded into round holes. If Moussaoui had been promptly
transferred to military custody, it would not have been necessary to
test—some would argue abuse—the use of a material witness
warrant in his case. The material witness problem, of course, was
resolved once Moussaoui was indicted on criminal changes.
In the early days after September 11, the Bush Administration
had not tested the full contours of the material witness statute for
detaining individuals. Since Moussaoui’s arrest, it has become
clear that an individual can be detained while a grand jury
115
investigation is pending.
Based on the witness’s possible
http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts/1:01-cr-00455/doca/68876/1.pdf. All of the
above documents are available at http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/1:01-cr00455/DocketSheet.html. Moussaoui’s court pleadings were so insulting and
inflammatory that at one point, Judge Brinkema ordered them sealed, only to
remove the ban thirteen days later. Associated Press, Moussaoui Judge Bars Release of
Insults (Sept. 6, 2002), at http://courttv.com/trials/moussaoui/090602_ap.html.
114. See discussion supra Part II.
115. United States v. Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42, 49–51 (2d Cir. 2003). The
requirement of promptly taking the witness’s deposition so he can be released
from custody can also be avoided. See id. at 62 (concluding that the deposition
mechanism is not automatically available for grand jury witnesses detained under
section 3144, and that post-deposition release of witnesses is subject to the court’s
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connection to a crime or possible assistance in solving a crime, a
witness can be detained even if the government does not have
probable cause—or any evidence—that the witness, himself or
116
herself, has committed a crime.
It is in this way, as many
commentators have noted, that the presumption of innocence and
117
other constitutional rights have been turned on their heads.
Material witnesses are mainly at the mercy of prosecutors who
are trusted to not abuse their discretion. In short, the criminal
system expects a prosecutor to issue subpoenas on the basis of good
faith instead of pretexts. With the secrecy that cloaks grand jury
proceedings, and with judges that are reluctant to probe behind
the reasons for grand jury subpoenas, these expectations are based
more on faith than on facts. After all, prosecutors can fall into the
possessive and incorrect snare of regarding subpoenas as their own,
118
rather than the grand jury’s.
Be that as it may, if the checks on
investigative abuses are to be effective, they should focus on the
discretion).
116. 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2004). The standard is whether “the testimony of a
person is material in a criminal proceeding.” Id.
117. Much has been written recently about the alleged abuses of this statute to
detain terrorism suspects. See, e.g., David Cole, The Priority of Morality: The
Emergency Constitution’s Blind Spot, 113 YALE L.J. 1753, 1778 (2004) (asserting that
the material witness statute circumvents restrictions—such as judicial review—
prescribed in section 412 of the USA PATRIOT Act); Quinn H. Vandenberg, How
can the United States Rectify Its Post-9/11 Stance on Noncitizens’ Rights?, 18 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 605, 623–25 (2004) (arguing that the material witness
statute is abusive because it is vague and neither limits how long a witness can be
detained nor dictates whether the government can compel the witness’s
testimony). In my experience as a federal prosecutor in the Southern District of
California, a core use of this statute was to detain illegal aliens so they could testify
against the traffickers that brought them from Mexico into the United States.
Without their testimony, the cases against the “coyotes” were weaker. These illegal
aliens did not need to be detained too long. With the agreement of defense
counsel, their testimony could be preserved for trial through a deposition under
Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and they could then be
returned to Mexico. On the other hand, many of those who have been held on
material witness warrants in terrorism investigations have been held for months, if
not years. See Steve Fainaru, Suspect Held 8 Months Without Seeing Judge, WASH. POST,
June 12, 2002, at A1 (reporting that a Boston cab driver was held in solitary
confinement for more than eight months without seeing a judge or receiving
assistance of counsel), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wpdyn?pagename=article&node=&contentId= A34822-2002Jun11&notFound=true;
Adam Liptak, Threats and Responses: The Detainees; For Post-9/11 Material Witness, It Is
a Terror of a Different Kind, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2004, at A1, available at 2004 WLNR
5371092 (describing how a material witness was arrested and held for sixteen
months without being charged for a crime or even asked to testify).
118. I know this from first hand experience.
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prosecutor’s practices rather than the grand jury’s.
IV. THE POLITICS OF MOUSSAOUI
It is easy to wonder why, in the face of all these problems and
complications, the Moussaoui case remains in federal district court.
The reason Moussaoui is still in the criminal system is more about
inertia than strategy. During the dangerous and uncertain days
after September 11, our officials could be forgiven for not being
able to think through all the implications of our counter-terrorism
policies. They were reacting to horrible events. More than three
years later, the public should be less forgiving with any
Administration that still bumbles about in the dark for a cohesive
119
strategy.
Bush officials may defend themselves, in a classified
cloak, by saying that they are keeping our enemies guessing. But it
is neither convincing nor right for them to keep most of the
American people guessing. The American public and our allies
need to be on board in a struggle that may last as long as the Cold
War. Part of getting them on board is being precise about the
objectives and the means for attaining them. Part of it is being
specific in measuring our progress.
In one area of confusion, it is not clear what principles led to
placing Jose Padilla in a military brig as opposed to placing John
Walker Lindh before a federal court. Both are U.S. citizens.
Walker Lindh, the so-called “American Taliban,” was captured on a
120
battlefield in Afghanistan.
Padilla, whom the Bush
121
Administration designated as the “dirty bomber,” was captured at
122
Chicago’s O’Hare airport. Did it make a difference that Padilla is
a Latino from mean streets, while Walker Lindh is a privileged
Caucasian from Marin County? Let’s hope not. Why are some of
Moussaoui’s cohorts in Guantanamo and secret locations while he
continues to reside at a federal detention center, part of the
criminal system, in Virginia? The time has come for answers. If
there are no answers, the time has come to admit the mistakes, to
rectify them, and to move on.
119. This is not the place to replay the criticism of the Bush invasion of Iraq as
a diversion from the overall goal of eradicating terrorists. My criticism goes far
beyond that conflict.
120. United States v. Lindh, 227 F. Supp. 2d 565, 568–69 (E.D. Va. 2002).
121. See Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 572–73 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
122. See Jared A. Simmons, Note, In Civilian Dress & With Hostile Purpose, 37
IND. L. REV. 579, 580 (2004).
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The Justice Department, for its part, probably wants to show
that it can finish what it started, that we can still prosecute terrorists
the old-fashioned way. And in a logic that only makes sense in
Washington, D.C.—because the Defense Department may still be
pushing for Moussaoui’s transfer to military custody—the Justice
Department may be reacting with the same force against a sister
123
agency.
Rather than “lose” to the Defense Department, the
Justice Department insists on the status quo.
The Justice Department is now headed by a new Attorney
124
General with less of a stake in the Moussaoui case.
Accordingly,
the Bush Administration has another opportunity to do something
125
that makes sense.
Even the chief of the Justice Department’s
Criminal Division when Moussaoui was indicted, Michael Chertoff,
has expressed some doubts about the wisdom of our policies.
When Chertoff, now the head of Homeland Security, was on the
bench in the Third Circuit, he floated the idea of enacting a special
statute, along the lines of British anti-terrorism laws, to authorize
126
the limited detention and interrogation of terrorism suspects.

123. See Dan Eggen, FBI Chief Says Tribunal May Try 9/11 Suspects, Jan. 15, 2004,
WASH. POST, at A1; Editorial, Missing Witnesses, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2004, at A14
(noting that the Bush administration has threatened to try Moussaoui before a
military tribunal); Philip Shenon, White House Called Target of Plane Plot, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 8, 2003, at A7 (reporting that Moussaoui would be tried before a military
tribunal if civilian courts ordered the government to grant Moussaoui access to
detainees).
124. Charles Hurt, Gonzales Confirmed Attorney General, WASH. TIMES. (Feb. 4,
2003), available at http://www.washtimes.com/national/20050204-1235447508r.htm.
125. I am a close friend of Robert Spencer, the lead Moussaoui prosecutor.
Although I have not discussed the proposal of this article with him, I doubt that it
will come as a surprise to him. Outside the moment, we all may agree that our
counter-terrorism policy is far more important than the rewards,
accomplishments, or satisfactions of any official involved in a particular case.
126. See Michael Chertoff, Law, Loyalty, & Terror: Our Legal Response to the Post9/11 World, THE WEEKLY STANDARD (Dec. 1, 2003), available at
https://www.weeklystandard.com/Utilities/printer_preview.asp?idArticle=3419&B
=C3BB2 (asserting that “[w]e need to debate a long-term and sustainable
architecture for the process of determining when, why, and for how long someone
may be detained as an enemy combatant, and what judicial review should be
available”). In a forthcoming article, I explore in more detail whether it is
possible to pass a sensible and constitutional statute that would allow a prolonged
detention, measured in months rather than days, of terrorism suspects for
interrogation for intelligence purposes. This statute at a minimum would create a
special detention court, parallel to the FISA court, to review applications from the
Executive Branch for such detentions.
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V. THE SPECIFICS OF A MILITARY TRIBUNAL
There are two components to the military proceedings for
Guantanamo detainees, all of whom are said to be other than U.S.
citizens. First, all detainees are to appear before the Combatant
Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) to determine whether or not they
127
Here, the status must be shown by a
are enemy combatants.
preponderance of the evidence to three commissioned military
128
officers. Under the CSRT, the rules of evidence are relaxed and
129
Once the government
a non-lawyer represents the detainee.
makes this showing, it may confine the detainees for the duration
of the combat, namely the confrontation with Al Qaeda, provided
130
they still pose a threat.
Second, if the government would like to
confine the detainee beyond the duration of the conflict, it may do
so through the military commissions that the President has
131
established.
Here, with a higher burden, the government must
show beyond a reasonable doubt to a tribunal of anywhere from
three to seven military officers that the detainee has violated the
132
laws of war. A two-thirds vote is sufficient for a verdict, and either
133
military or civilian counsel may represent the detainee.
The
hearsay rules are relaxed so that any evidence that has “probative
134
In Moussaoui’s
value to a reasonable person” may be admitted.
case, this article assumes that the government could meet the
burden of either the CSRT or the military commission, but the
127. Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense, to the
Secretary of the Navy (July 7, 2004), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/
news/Jul2004/d20040707review.pdf.
128. Memorandum from Gordon England, Secretary of the Navy (July 29,
2004),
available
at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/
d20040730comb.pdf.
129. Id.
130. Memorandum from Gordon England, Secretary of the Navy (Sept. 14,
2004),
available
at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Sep2004/
d20040914adminreview.pdf (establishing the annual Administrative Review
Procedures for enemy combatants). As of March 1, 2005, the U.S. Military has
held 558 CSRT hearings. Defense Department, Combatant Status Review Tribunal
Summary,
available
at
http://www.defenselink.mil/
news/Mar2005/d20050301csrt.pdf (last visited April 15, 2005).
131. Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War
Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57833 (Nov. 13, 2001).
132. Department of Defense Military Commission Order No. 1, §§ 4(A)(2)–
(3), 6(F) (Mar. 21, 2002), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/
Mar2002/ d20020321ord.pdf.
133. Id. at 4(C) and 6(F).
134. Id. at 6(D)(1).
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focus is on the military commission.
This article is not intended as a specific analysis of all the
procedures of the Bush Administration’s military commission. In
arguing that Moussaoui should be transferred to military custody,
this article can accept the basics of what the Bush Administration
has proposed for military commissions. Going a bit further, it
seems clear that the procedures need not be as stingy as those that
the Bush Administration has proposed. For example, contrary to
the Bush Administration order, a unanimous verdict could be
called for out of fairness to the accused and out of a concern for
the credibility of the military proceedings to our public and to the
135
international community.
The great advantages of a military
tribunal for the Moussaoui case are that the use of military
personnel increases the chances that the fact-finders can obtain
security clearances to hear any classified information necessary to
136
the case and that much of the trial could be closed to the public.
To repeat, the criminal law paradigm in dealing with noncitizens who are parts of plots or organizations intent on killing
U.S. citizens and destroying U.S. property does not strike the
proper balance between the government’s legitimate interest in
protecting the secrecy and efficacy of counter-terrorism operations
137
and the defendant’s right to a fair trial.
The non-U.S. citizen
such as Moussaoui who avoided wearing a military uniform so he
could blend into American society to kill American citizens,
whether as part of the September 11 plot or some other plot,
whether the intended victims were on U.S. soil or elsewhere, is a
138
direct descendent of the Ex Parte Quirin defendants, who were
appropriately treated in a military tribunal.

135. See Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War
against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57835 (requiring only a two-thirds majority to
convict an enemy combatant).
136. See Military Commission Order No. 1 at § 4(C)(3) (stating that the
accused may hire civilian counsel if it is determined the attorney is eligible to
access “SECRET” level classified information); id. at § 6(B)(3) (stating that the
proceedings should be open “the maximum extent possible,” but some
proceedings may be closed to protect classified information, including prospective
witnesses; intelligence and law enforcement sources, methods, or activities; and
other national security interests).
137. One of the government interests is the interrogation for intelligence
purposes of high-value detainees, some of whom Moussaoui would like to access.
An obvious method of disrupting terrorist plots is to know about them in their
planning stage before they are implemented.
138. 317 U.S. 1, 35 (1942).
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Some reasonable arguments have been made for hesitating,
for not taking the government on faith, before resorting to military
139
tribunals.
Regardless, the Government’s allegations in the
Moussaoui indictment, contrary to what Professor Margulies
implies, do constitute more than the Executive branch’s “mere
140
assertion of exigency.”
Instead, the detail to the Moussaoui
indictment lays out a prima facie case that Moussaoui has violated
141
the laws of war.
The Government is not under the same discovery obligations
in a military tribunal as it is in a federal district court. This is one
lesson of Quirin where fewer constitutional safeguards were
142
required for military tribunals.
Further, despite the voices of
dissent, there is ample scholarly support for trying individuals who
143
have violated the laws of war in military tribunals. The Executive
Branch now has the discretion, even if it lacks the wisdom, to do
what is proposed in this article. If the Bush Administration is
serious when it states that we are engaged in a war on terrorism, it
logically follows that captured enemies should be dealt with as
combatants rather than criminal defendants. Finally, no further
Congressional authorization is necessary to transfer Moussaoui
from federal district court to a military tribunal.
There are at least four reasons why the President does not
need any further Congressional authorization to transfer
Moussaoui to a military tribunal. First, the President has ample
144
powers as the Commander in Chief of the military.
Second,

139. See Peter Margulies, Judging Terror in the “Zone of Twilight”: Exigency,
Institutional Equity, and Procedure after September 11, 84 B.U. L. REV. 383 (2004). For
a harsher attack on military tribunals, see Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe,
Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259 (2002).
140. See Margulies, supra note 139 at 440.
141. Second Superceding Indictment, Count Four, United States v. Moussaoui,
282 F. Supp. 480 (E.D. Va. entered Jul. 16, 2002) (Criminal No. 01-455-A),
available at http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/1:01-cr-00455/docs/66826/
0.pdf.
[D]efendant . . . unlawfully, willfully and knowingly combined,
conspired, confederated and agreed to use weapons of mass
destruction, namely, airplanes intended for use as missiles, bombs, and
similar devices, and other weapons of mass destruction, without lawful
authority against persons within the United States . . . with the result
that thousands of people died on September 11, 2001.
Id.
142. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 39–41.
143. See Margulies, supra note 139, at 437 n.263.
144. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
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Congress has established a system of military justice and granted
145
the Executive Branch the authority to make rules in this field.
This provides general support for treating some individuals outside
the criminal system. Third, a week after the September 11 attacks,
Congress authorized the President to “use all necessary and
appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons”
146
behind the September 11 attacks. This provides specific support.
Fourth, the “4001(a) statute” that provides that “no citizen shall be
. . . detained . . . by the United States except pursuant to an Act of
Congress” does not require express authorization to detain illegal
147
On this last point, Professor Margulies’s analysis is
combatants.
sound that this statute does not preclude implied authorizations for
detentions, that this statute is more backward-looking to prevent
internments along the lines of the American concentration camps
148
during World War II.
Professor Margulies seems off the mark,
however, to the extent he seems to suggest that the implied
authorization can only reach attacks on U.S. citizens and U.S.
property within the United States. The Authorization for Use of
Military Force, after all, speaks of preventing “any future acts of
international terrorism against the United States.” This addresses
an attack on our nation. Accordingly, a broad and—arguably—
more correct reading of this Authorization covers illegal
combatants that attack U.S. citizens and U.S. property anywhere in
the world.
Hardly anyone can doubt that our counter-terrorism efforts
are global; it follows that in a global war we may find and capture
illegal combatants inside and outside the United States. Indeed, as
much as the academy, the human rights organizations, and the selfelected defenders of civil liberties try to maintain clear distinctions
between the domestic and international realms, the doctrinal lines
blur and break down in such a war. Our strategy and our law
should be nimble enough to keep up with the changes in the
battlefield. To preserve our values and to prevail, our strategy for
the battle must incorporate healthy doses of idealism and realism.
A single dose of either will not do. Just so, this proposal, eschewing
the intellectual clarity of any pole, is one attempt at blending these
145. 10 U.S.C. §§ 801–940 (2005).
146. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107–40, 115 Stat. 224
(codified at 50 U.S.C.A. § 1541 (West 2004)).
147. 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2004).
148. Margulies, supra note 139, at 423.
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doses to find the right balance for difficult times.
As another balance, some commentators, while not completely
opposed to detaining illegal combatants, have suggested placing
149
time limits on these detentions. The flaw with their suggestion is
that it goes counter to the principles of an effective interrogation.
The terrorist organizations will train their operatives—and the
operatives will be motivated—to withstand the interrogation until
the time of the publicized limit. Effective interrogation, by
contrast, depends on the isolation and the uncertainty of the
150
detainee.
A general critique of time limits, of course, does not preclude
us from secretly putting specific limits in place before a special
court, cleared for classified information. To be sure, in no event
should an endless detention of an illegal combatant be tolerated.
Up front a choice should be made: The combatant should be
interrogated, tried in a military tribunal, released to another
authority, or freed. One option, say interrogation, does not
necessarily preclude another option, say trial in a military tribunal,
but in no event should a combatant languish outside of a legal
category. In Moussaoui’s case, although much of his information
has gotten cold, this mystery man still must have useful information
and corroboration for U.S. interrogators. Therefore, implicit to
the proposal that he be transferred outside the criminal system is
the notion that all the other options, interrogation, trial, or release,
should be available. Back in the criminal system the only option
that seems to have been pursued is the circus.
VI. MOUSSAOUI IN LIGHT OF RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
As important as choosing the correct location for Moussaoui’s
detention is choosing the correct basis for detaining him. Even if
Moussaoui has access to the courts through the writ of habeas
corpus, the Executive Branch should be able to conform with some
149. See id. at 414.
150. See Declaration of Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby (Jan. 9, 2003), available
at http://www.cnss.org/Jacoby_Declaration.pdf.
Permitting Padilla any access to counsel may substantially harm our
national security interests . . . . Only after such time as Padilla has
perceived that help is not on the way can the United States reasonably
expect to obtain all possible intelligence from Padilla . . . . Providing him
access to counsel . . . would break—probably irreparably—the sense of
dependency and trust that the interrogators are attempting to create.
Id.
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minimal process, perhaps by ex parte, in camera filings, that
demonstrates to a court or some other body the probable cause
151
that Moussaoui is a terrorist.
Therefore, his military detention
can be justified under the rule of law.
The following discussion illustrates that the Supreme Court’s
recent decisions may already provide sufficient authority to detain
Moussaoui in a military facility and to interrogate him for an
extended period of time. Moussaoui was a non-U.S. citizen,
detained in the United States, and part of conspiracy to kill
Americans in the United States and outside the United States.
Although the Supreme Court denied the Bush Administration’s
argument that detainees at Guantanamo Bay do not have any right
to American courts, the Court did not challenge the Bush
Administration’s position that, once a non-U.S. citizen’s status as an
illegal enemy combatant has been demonstrated, he may be held
152
outside the criminal system.
One question is whether Moussaoui needs to be treated any
differently from the detainees in Guantanamo. Because the Bush
Administration has not disclosed many details about individual
detainees at Guantanamo, it is difficult to make specific
153
comparisons to Moussaoui.
The majority of the Guantanamo
detainees seemed to have been captured by the United States, by
Northern Alliance allies, or by intermediaries during the successful
military operation against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in
154
Afghanistan.
Accordingly, Moussaoui differs from the typical
151. For this purpose, the definition of terrorist from the United States
Criminal Code could be copied or adapted. The water here, however, is quite
murky. There is widespread confusion on the precise definition of terrorism.
Numerous federal statutes define the term, each with a somewhat different
conclusion on what constitutes an act of terrorism. See 6 U.S.C. § 101(15) (2005);
18 U.S.C. § 2331 (2005) (differentiating “international terrorism” from “domestic
terrorism”); 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5) (2005) (listing no fewer than thirty statute
sections that can be violated for a crime to be considered a “federal crime of
terrorism”).
152. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct.
2686 (2004).
153. See Press Release, White House Press Secretary, Status of Detainees at
Guantanamo
(Feb.
7,
2002),
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2002/02/ 20020207-13.html; News Transcript, Department of
Defense, Briefing on Detainee Operations at Guantanamo Bay (Feb. 13, 2004), available
at
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2004/tr20040213-0443.html;
Department of Defense, Guantanamo Detainees (Mar. 16, 2004), at
http://www.usinfo.state.gov/dhr/Archive/2004/Mar/17-718401.html.
154. The United States Government has acknowledged approximately 640
detainees in Guatanamo. Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686, 2690 (2004). Some more
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detainee in Guantanamo in at least two ways. First, he was arrested
in the United States, not overseas. Second, he was arrested before
September 11 and before Congress passed the Authorization for
155
Use of Military Force.
Whether these factual differences have
legal significance is another matter. The threat Moussaoui posed
to the United States was as great, if not greater, than that of many
Guantanamo detainees who played logistical but not operational
roles for Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Further, because the
Authorization for Use of Military Force was tied to the September
11 attacks, that Authorization should have an obvious retroactive
156
effect on individuals who were part of the September 11 plot.
In relation to earlier Supreme Court precedent, Moussaoui
should be in no better legal position than German saboteurs who,
along with a German-American citizen, were convicted in a military
157
tribunal and sentenced to death during World War II.
Like
Moussaoui, these Germans came to the United States on a mission
158
Like Moussaoui, these Germans wore civilian dress,
of sabotage.
having buried their uniforms once they landed on American
159
beaches.
Unlike Moussaoui, these Germans were soldiers in a
160
As
situation where there had been a mutual declaration of war.
to Moussaoui’s organization, Al Qaeda, it took a “second” Pearl
161
Harbor before we reciprocated their declaration of war.
recent detainees may have come from the Iraqi conflict. See Dana Priest, Memo Lets
CIA Take Detainees Out of Iraq, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 2004, at A01.
155. Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
156. Id.
That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate
force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that
occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or
persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism
against the United States by such nations, organizations, or persons.
Id.
157. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 21 (1942); see also Juliet Stumpf, Citizens of an
Enemy Land: Enemy Combatants, Aliens, and the Constitutional Rights of the PseudoCitizen, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 79 (2004); Carl Tobias, Punishment and the War on
Terrorism, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1116 (2004); A. Christopher Bryant & Carl Tobias,
Quirin Revisited, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 309 (2003).
158. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 21.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat.
224 (2001). For anyone who would listen, Usama Bin Laden issued his declaration
in a fatwa delivered in August 1996.
My Muslim Brothers of the World: Your brothers in Palestine and in the
land of the two Holy Places are calling upon your help and asking you to
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Moussaoui should be in no better legal position than Yaser
Esam Hamdi, arrested in Afghanistan, held in Guantanamo, and
then transferred to a military brig once American authorities
162
confirmed that he was a dual Saudi-American citizen.
Unlike
Hamdi, however, Moussaoui was not caught “carrying a weapon
163
against American troops on a foreign battlefield.”
In a sense, if
the government’s allegations are true, Moussaoui himself could be
viewed as a weapon of destruction on American soil. Hamdi was
detained and interrogated for over two years, most of it without
164
access to defense counsel.
When Hamdi’s case arrived at the
Supreme Court, Justice O’Connor wrote a plurality opinion that
stated, based on the Authorization for Use of Military Force, that
even an American citizen could be held outside the criminal system
165
on a showing that he was an illegal enemy combatant. In Justice
O’Connor’s view, Hamdi was entitled to some legal process to
confirm his status, but not to the full-blown protections of an
166
Article III court.
Further, Justice O’Connor indicated that once
the Government has given Hamdi a modicum of due process, he
could be held away from the “battlefield” for the duration of the
167
hostilities.
What is not clear from the opinion is whether the
Government has a separate right to interrogate the illegal enemy
combatant. Justice O’Connor states that interrogation is not one of
168
the Government’s interests. But this statement may be limited to
Hamdi’s facts. In other words, the Supreme Court may accept a
different Congressional authorization that is more specific

take part in fighting against the enemy—your enemy and their enemy—
the Americans and the Israelis. They are asking you to do whatever you
can, with one own means and ability, to expel the enemy, humiliated and
defeated, out of the sanctities of Islam.
PBS, Bin Laden’s Fatwa, available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/
international/fatwa_1996.html. For those who believe actions are more important
than words, Al Qaeda made its intentions clear in the first bombing of the World
Trade Center, the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and the
attack on the U.S.S. Cole.
162. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct 2633, 2636 (2004).
163. Id. at 2642 n.1.
164. Id. at 2636.
165. Id. at 2640 (“There is no bar to this Nation’s holding one of its own
citizens as an enemy combatant.”).
166. Id. at 2648–51.
167. Id. at 2640.
168. Id. at 2651 (“Hamdi contends that the AUMF does not authorize
indefinite or perpetual detention. Certainly, we agree that indefinite detention
for the purpose of interrogation is not authorized.”).
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concerning interrogation for intelligence purposes. As usual, the
Supreme Court left the task of sorting out the details to the lower
courts. Before this could be done on the Hamdi case, rather than
test the limits on detentions of American citizens as illegal enemy
combatants, the Bush Administration negotiated a deal with
169
Hamdi.
In exchange for Hamdi renouncing his American
citizenship, the Bush Administration released him to Saudi Arabia
170
where he had spent most of his life after being born in Texas.
The irony to this case is that this illegal enemy combatant seems to
have fared better than a comparable criminal defendant, U.S.
citizen John Walker Lindh, also arrested in Afghanistan, who struck
171
a twenty-year deal in the Eastern District of Virginia.
Now it is left to the Padilla case, reversed and remanded
because of a procedural error under habeas corpus, to test the
172
limits on detention of U.S. citizens. The lessons of Padilla may or
may not apply to Moussaoui. Padilla is said to have made contacts
with Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but was arrested in the
173
United States.
As happened with Hamdi, however, the Bush
Administration may reach a deal with Padilla before the courts are
given a full opportunity to sort out the case. The district court in
the Padilla case, on remand, has ruled that the Bush
Administration did not have the authority to detain Padilla as an
174
The court distinguished Hamdi because
enemy combatant.
175
Padilla was unarmed when he was arrested in the United States.
176
And, to distinguish Quirin, the court stated that Congress had not
169. Press Release, Department of Justice, U.S. Releases Enemy Combatant to
Return
to
Saudi
Arabia
(Sept.
22,
2004),
available
at
http://www.usinfo.state.gov/dhr/ Archive/2004/Sep/23-993718.html.
170. Id.; Richard Willing, U.S. to Send Detainee Back to Saudi Arabia Without
Charges, USA TODAY, Sept. 22, 2004, http://www.usatoday.com/nes/
washington/2004-09-22-us-hamdi_x.htm.
171. Plea Agreement, United States v. Lindh, Criminal No. 02-37A (E.D. Va.
2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/pleaagreement.htm. John Walker
Lindh’s request to the Justice Department that his sentence be shortened in light
of Hamdi’s release was denied. This disparate treatment between Lindh and
Hamdi should be a warning to the self-designated protectors of civil liberties who
seem to always support the criminal process over other venues. In short, be
careful what you ask for. See CNN, “I Plead Guilty,” Taliban American Says, (Jul. 17,
2002), at http://archives.cnn.com/2002/LAW07/15/walker.lindh.hearing.
172. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S.Ct. 2711, 2727 (2004).
173. Id. at 2715, 2715 n.2.
174. Padilla v. Hanft, Civil Action No. 2:04-2221-26AJ, slip op. at 10 (D.S.C.
Feb. 28, 2005).
175. Id. at 6.
176. Id.
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specifically authorized Padilla’s detention.
But this is not
necessarily the last word; the Justice Department has filed its notice
177
of appeal.
As to non-U.S. citizens, the Guantanamo cases are working
their way back through the courts. Now that the Supreme Court
has ruled that the Guantanamo detainees are entitled to relief in
U.S. courts through habeas corpus petitions, the lower courts are
testing how much process they must be given in determining their
status as enemy combatants. These determinations are separate
from trials in the military tribunals.
Since Justice Department prosecutors have proven the
probable cause of their charges against Moussaoui through the
presentation of an indictment to a grand jury, since they have
appeared many times to defend their case before Judge Brinkema,
meeting the standards of a “combatant status review” would be a
formality for the Government in the Moussaoui case. Indeed, if the
Bush Administration had been wiser in its strategy it would have
fully tested its counter-terrorism strategy on non-U.S. citizens, such
as Moussaoui and the Guantanamo detainees, before considering
178
these policies on U.S. citizens such as Hamdi and Padilla.
VII. CONCLUSION
Zacarias Moussaoui should have been dealt with as we are
dealing with Khaled Sheik Mohammed and other members of the
Al Qaeda terrorist network: through non-criminal detention. This
stands true even if Moussaoui pleads guilty or is convicted in
federal court. Al Qaeda is more a military or an intelligence agency
problem than a law enforcement problem. Placing him in a
federal district court for a criminal trial was a mistake. Continuing
the criminal process after evidence, including an in-court
confession, confirmed that he was a member of Al Qaeda, was a
177. Notice
of
Appeal
(Mar.
11,
2005),
available
at
http://www.scd.uscourts.gov/Padilla/Images/00000050.pdf.
178. Professor David Cole, who gives much less leeway to the Executive Branch
than I, suggests that this testing on non-U.S. citizens and resident legal aliens is a
precursor for restrictions on the rights of U.S. citizens. See, e.g., David Cole, Enemy
Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953 (2002). For this reason, he argues that we must be
vigilant in protecting the “other” because the other could soon become us.
Solidarity is in our self-interest. Therefore, while Professor Cole and I probably do
not agree on the correct balance between individual liberty and group safety in
national security cases, I hope that we agree it was a mistake to test the limits of
our Constitution on U.S. citizens before we tested the limits on foreign citizens.
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bigger mistake. Further continuing the criminal process, despite
all the costs and complications, despite the risks to intelligence
sources and methods, despite the bad precedent it sets, would be
an even bigger mistake. The time has come. A military tribunal for
Moussaoui is better late than never.
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